Gorbachev's bloody blow on Baku, 20 January, 1990

As the cause for the introduction of troops in Baku Gorbachev used Armenian pogroms, which was actually the case (56 people were killed in those pogroms, including 42 Armenians; just like on 13 January, 1990 in Sumgayit, the first victim was a refugee from Armenia killed by another Armenian).

The head of Z department of the KGB Vladimir Lutsenko and the head of a section Valery Khmelev write, "What did it come to? There were Azerbaijanis living around Spitak in mountainous regions of Armenia.

They were thrown out of their houses, often deprived of their belongings. And all those masses of people moved to Baku. Spontaneously. They were not waited for there. Not every one reached the capital (some were killed or froze to death in the mountains - Author) but many of them. The most dreadful thing happened in Baku, when homeless and hurt people began venting their anger on Baku Armenians."

When beginning that multimove provocation, its authors undoubtedly saw clearly the entire train of further events. They did not care about the fate of Baku Armenians, for the latter were useful for them merely as living human resources for the world-wide black PR action."

"Pravda" special correspondents A. Gorokhov and V. Okulov were writing those days, "What did it take to push, like a stone from a steep, a farmer who had run on pain of death from Armenia to the industrial Baku, a man deprived of his home and, as a rule, with far-from-perfect political training, into the abyss of unlawfulness? What did it take to provoke outrage from such a man, burning from wrath, resentful against fate, against the Armenians and finally against the Soviet power?"

There are still many questions about the events to ask those numerous forces that were active in the city at that time.

When asked why he had not interfered in the events, the commander of the USSR Internal Troops Colonel General Y. Shatalin who had been in Baku during the Armenian pogroms and had every opportunity to stop the tragedy answered cynically, "No one asked us to help."

"Could we foresee that explosion?" Vaghif Huseynov asks himself. "Of course, we could. In October 1989, our reference to the leaders of the country and the republic warned directly that crisis could occur in the nearest two or three months, and an explosion would follow, mass disorders… The leaders of the Soviet Union were aware of that as well."

K. Myalo writes, "What can we say about Baku then, a big modern capital city? A pogrom there was unprecedented in the contemporary history, and here we can speak of superorganization, a powerful "hand from the shadow" that demonstrated all its ruthlessness on 20 January, 1990, the day of introduction of the Soviet Army units in Baku. It was accompanied by such "concurrence of circumstances" that just could not be accidental but had organization of the most brutal mass bloodshed possible as its object."

Statements of those people representing different political forces and different political beliefs indicate the most important thing, that is the mysteriousness of the events preceding the introduction of troops in Baku.

The chairman of the Party Commission of the Azerbaijan SSR CP Central Committee R. Akhundov says, "On 14 January, 1990, a closed meeting of the Bureau was held to discuss the situation around the pogroms of 13-15 January in Baku and declaration of state of emergency in Baku and a number of other regions.

The leaders of the Central Committee (the first and the second secretaries, the chairman of Council of Ministers of the republic, the head of the KGB) and officials from Moscow (Primakov, Ghirenko and others) decided to misinform the rest of the Bureau members and said that state of emergency would not be declared, which turned out to be a lie. To consolidate it, Afrand Dashdamirov was even entrusted with speaking on television on the behalf of the Communist Party Central Committee, which he did together with the representative of the CPSU Central Committee Mikhaylov."

At the well-known meeting in front of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee, the author came under fire of Soviet soldiers and heard with his own ears Primakov saying to the marchers the following, "State of emergency will not be declared in Baku, troops will not be brought in Baku. If you do not believe me, take me hostage!" According to B. Vakhabzade, Primakov said the same while meeting with Baku intellectuals and the sheikh. That proved to be a lie.

The author has a firm conviction that Primakov's moves in Baku fully imitated those of his beloved Y. Andropov during Hungarian events. The USSR ambassador to Hungary Yuri Andropov assured the Hungarian authorities that troops would not be brought in the country for the purpose of solving political problems. According to researchers of that period, Andropov was intentionally deceiving the Hungarian government. Even when tanks were already on the move he still assured the head of Hungarian Council of Ministers Imre Nagy (who was executed later) that troops were being brought in railway stations so as not to disturb transportation and some special subdivisions to secure order in military units.

Everyone knows how all that ended.

The truth was as follows.

Dmitry Yazov's testimony to the Prosecutor's office of Azerbaijan says, "…On 19 January, 1990 I was invited to President Gorbachev. Minister of internal affairs was called there as well. The rest of those present were the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers N. Ryzhkov and the chairman of the Supreme Council A. Lukyanov. Gorbachev said a dangerous situation had emerged in Baku and that Bakatin and I were to go there and restore the order. The same day, 5.00 p.m. local time we arrived in Baku. Here, in the office of the commander of the western direction General N. Popov, we met with representative of the USSR president Y. Primakov and O. Shenin, the first secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee A. Vezirov, discussed the situation and decided to declare state of emergency. On the night of 20 January, regular troops of the Soviet Army were brought in Baku."

As we can see, the entire top leadership of the USSR was present at the decision making on the introduction of troops in Baku, just like it was with the introduction of troops in Afghanistan.

Afterwards, one of the butchers of the Azerbaijan people, the USSR minister of defence Dmitry Yazov recalled, "Gorbachev is a spineless person. He had the army in his hands, as well as the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. So what? It was quite possible to stop that turmoil with Nagorno-Karabakh, wasn't it? But he did not do that. He declared state of emergency in Baku. He invited me, Kryuchkov and Pugo. We went there but still without a written order. I say, "Give us a written order." "YOU REALLY HAVE A BEE IN YOUR BONNET ABOUT THAT SCRAP OF PAPER, LATER…" (highlighted by the author)."

He calls the document concerning the fate of hundreds of thousands people, killed and wounded, a "scrap of paper"!

This evidence of Yazov alone is judicial matter; it seems that the Soviet Army occupied a peaceful city, killing and injuring hundreds of civilian people, WITHOUT A DULY AUTHENTICATED WRITTEN ORDER OF THE SUPREME COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, I.E. GORBACHEV! As for Gorbachev's spinelessness, only such a naive soldier as Yazov can think so!

His spinelessness was rather selective!

Y. Primakov remembers the process of decision making concerning the introduction of troops in Baku, "On 19 January, I was in the office of the secretary of the Azerbaijan CP Central Committee Vezirov, together with the latter, when Gorbachev phoned. He said the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council had made the decision to bring troops in Baku. I told Mikhail Sergeyevich that I could not control military actions (however, Primakov coped with all other "actions" perfectly well - Author). The answer followed that minister of defence Yazov and minister of internal affairs Bakatin would depart for Baku an hour later."

Here is how the local authorities saw the introduction of troops in Baku on 20 January, 1990. The chairman of the Party Commission of the Azerbaijan SSR CP Central Committee R. Akhundov tells, "On 19 January, 1990, 11.30 p.m., in "Voice of America" (?! - Author) I heard the report that troopswould be brought in Baku that day. Realizing that there was only 30 minutes left, I ran to the Central Committee, noticed a flare pot on my way there and believed that the information was true. At the entrance I ran into the secretaries of the Central Committee G. Gasanov, T. Orujev, the head of department Abdinov and the aid of the first secretary Saib Kuliyev who were going out. At first, the did not believe what I aid but then they began worrying and, seeing the light still burning in the office of the chairman of the Council of Ministers A. Mutalibov, we went there. It was 11.45 p.m. A. Mutalibov was bewildered at hearing the information and said that it was impossible, that there would be a meeting of the Bureau. However, he yielded to our persistent demands and contacted Y. Primakov and then Yazov, if I am not mistaken. In the phone conversation, he told them about our arrival and demands to clarify the situation. Primakov started talking of the explosion in the television centre and capture of power by extremists. G. Gasanov grasped the receiver and began accusing them rather sharply of deceit and demanded withdrawal of he troops. G. Gasanov can tell about this himself much better.

Then firing started and I realized that all our efforts and demands for canceling the introduction of troops in Baku turned out to be useless. I left the office and came into the street. I saw soldiers laying metal plates that fixed the doors into the prepared niches in the street doorways of the building of the Council of Ministers, and trucks blocking the entrance at the gates. We stopped a passing car, drove to Lenin Av. where buzz and small-arms and heavy weapons firing were already heard. I came back and demanded that A. Mutalibov should take all measures to stop the troops from entering, which he promised to do, saying that he was going to contact the USSR Council of Ministers Ryzhkov. For a moment, the firing died down and I thought that the movement of troops had probably been stopped indeed. However, the subsequent events left no doubt that it was the beginning of dreadful and tragic events. Up to 4.30 a.m. I went out and in, called Mutalibov but after he answered that he had done his best to stop the invasion, I understood that spending the whole night in his office in Vezirov's absence, Mutalibov had actually assumed the full responsibility and it was pointless to phone him again."

As we can see, the authorities had no unity and solidarity. No one predicted the events, no one knew what he was to do at that horrible time, finally no one knew where the first secretary, their head was. The whereabouts of Vezirov at that time remained a sealed book. It is a heart-melting sight, indeed, Mutalibov, who suddenly found himself lumbered with the full responsibility for the events, calling Ryzhkov, one of the chief enemies of the Azerbaijan people, which Mutalibov might have been unaware of.

One of the party officials mentioned by Akhundov above, who asked not reveal his name, said to the author that it had been the moment that they had realized how skillfully they had been deceived by Primakov.

Gorbachev tells about Primakov's part ten years later, quite definitely and in detail. In those years, however, he used to get off with common phrases.

On the tenth anniversary of the putsch of August 1991, the former president of the USSR Mikhail Gorbachev, "Foros ex-prisoner", visited Radio Liberty studio.

Questions are asked by journalists Fleming Rose, Moscow correspondent of the Danish "Jutland Posten" and the observer of "Vremya Novostey" Vera Kuznetsova. The host is Andrey Shary.

Mikhail Gorbachev. "First of all, about working out the documents. Our Constitution for one says (and so did Stalin's and Brezhnev's ones) that Soviet republics are state formations, possess sovereignty, self-determination right up to separation. But did we have a law about secession from the USSR? No, we did not. So many constitutional provisions and no law. So a thesis was drawn, certain clauses in the Constitution on the declaration of state of emergency in a certain situation in the territory of the republic where something happens, by the way, by consent of that republic. Why did they say in Baku, "Why could Gorbachev not interfere immediately?" Because we contacted our friends, colleagues, the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan, and they would say, "The situation is under control." And then, when I sent Primakov there, I said, "There's something wrong going on, the information is quite grave." Primakov phoned two days later, after his arrival at Baku, "The situation is out of control, Mikhail Sergeyevich. It can turned out to be bloody events. The authorities have been overthrown in 18 regions of Azerbaijan. Just swept away. 200 km of the border ruined, and much more…" I asked, "What about the Supreme Council?" "The Supreme Council is isolated. It is inactive. Some are scared and do not move, others are not allowed. That is why the activity of the Central Committee and the Supreme Council is paralyzed. That's all. Something must be done." But what could we do? Bring in troops… We could not already get the consent of the Supreme Council. It was just paralyzed. Then, in such situation, we had the right to bring in troops. I agreed…"

Nice, isn't it? One suggests, the other agrees.

Primakov was executing Gorbachev's order in Baku. It was his official mission. But he had also another secret unofficial post. Vladimir Voronov writes, "In 1991, after coming in the foreign intelligence service, Yevgeny Maximovich denied stoutly his cooperation with the KGB. "The White Book of Russian Secret Services" mentions Primakov and says that the latter maintained "long-term official and personal contacts with the employees of the 1st central department of the USSR KGB." Then rather intimate information leaks into the press with references to Kalugin, that the future academician appeared in the KGB papers under the secret alias of "Maxim". Academician got very resentful against Kalugin but did not argue the statement. Yevgeny Maximovich never hides, though, his close business and personal contacts with the KGB resident in Cairo Vadim Kirpichenko. Moreover, after settling down in Yasenevo, Primakov appointed Kirpichenko his personal adviser, actually, first deputy…" We cannot rule out the possibility that he played different roles in Baku.

In accordance with Gorbachev's order, the Soviet Army entered Baku on the night of 20 January, 1990, sowing death and destruction on its way.

A. Karaulov writes, "The armed invasion in Baku was prepared by the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB. The code name of the operation was "Blow". The key role was given to the special group "Alfa" and the subversive group "A" of the KGB. By Gorbachev's order, the Soviet power in Baku was being saved by three persons, Dmitry Yazov, Vadim Bakatin and Philipp Bobkov, the first deputy of Kryuchkov in the KGB. They appeared in Baku a week before that fatal night. Bakatin called himself, let us say, "General Grigoryev".

Politicians finished their dirty work and the Soviet Army comes to the foreground, staining the last page of its biography in the frames of the USSR with indelible disgrace.

"…Report, Yuri Alexeyevich (the regiment commander of the 76th Pskov Airborne Division Colonel Y.A. Naumov - Author), what is the matter?" I said.

"Allow me to repeat, Comrade Colonel."

"Well, do repeat!"

"Minister of Defence raised his fist to my nose and said, "You just try to fail to capture it!" Tell Lebed this!"

"Is that all?"

"Yes, it is!"

"And what is it we are to capture?"

"Well, Baku. There's nothing else here to capture."

Mission: to capture a two-million populated city, a nice and simple task (?! - Author). Baku is in 30 km.

"Ahead!" I ordered.

…Ryazan regiment, Kostroma regiment moved to Baku.

…We are driven by our trained airborne "chauvinism" ("there are no impossible missions" and "no one but us"). Aggressiveness and hatred awake… (?! - Author)

By 5 o'clock, the regiments occupied the specified regions. Pskov Airborne Division entered the city from the east, from "Nasosny" airfield. Plus motorized infantry subdivisions manned with hastily called up "guerillas" from Rostov, Krasnodar and Stavropol regions."

This is how General Lebed describes the "heroism" of himself and the troops he was in charge of. He commanded the airborne division that entered Baku on 20 January, 1990 and was extremely proud of that afterwards.

If we replace Russian names with German ones and shift the date to 22 June, 1941, when fascist generals encouraged their soldiers before the attack on the USSR, it will be hard to tell the difference between the words of Lebed and fascist generals, unless the latter were more reserved than Lebed.

Fascism is the plague of the mankind for all times. At the same time, we cannot say that German soldiers in the Second World War were uncivilized trash; they were people, dreadfully convinced in their racial superiority. As for the armed gang called the Soviet Army that invaded Baku, the city which ranked among the ten best USSR cities according to its basic social and cultural characteristics, it was exactly a set of trash and alcoholics who did not wash themselves every day and had all but a vague idea about toilet bowls.

These insects annihilated the best gene pool of the nation.

Far from sympathizing with Baku, Victor Nikolaev writes, "Everything got mized in Baku, the starting point of unwinding the Transcaucasian spiral. Everything lost its sense in no time. The life, so far stable and unshakable, given in 1917, became slimy at once and slid like a sand castle on the Caspian shore. Days sometimes seemed hours, minutes lasted for centuries. There were plenty such detached companies like Victor's and Slavka's. Army groups protecting the civilian population received tasks five times a day with utmost certainty, "At your discretion and within your responsibility." Just this, no more, no less. SO THE RESPONSIBILITY WAS LUMBERED ON THE SHOULDER STRAPS OF RUSSIAN CAPTAINS, SERGEANTS, SOLDIERS, DAZED WITH INSOMNIA, NOISE, HYSTERICS, AND LOOTING (highlighted by the author)."

We must add that over 90% of the key personnel of the Soviet Army were Christians; ethnic factor came to the foreground after the beginning of Gorbachev's perestroika.

The situation in the army was also aggravated by Gorbachev's attack on the southern Muslim republics (the Uzbek case, the cotton case in Azerbaijan etc.).

Gorbachev artificially created the illusion in the citizens, as if it were only sufficient to reveal shortcomings in those branches to increase living standard in the USSR.

The brass of the Soviet Army undoubtedly knew about these political trends, and so did middle ranks the majority of whom were miserable people, which by no means favoured their civilized attitude to the Muslim republics.

The Azerbaijan people had to suffer all this aggression to the full extent in the terrible January days of 1990.

The difference between the invaders that had established the Soviet power in the beginning of the last century and the present who, according to them, were restoring it was just that the former had appeared n Baku in armoured cars and the latter in tanks. They could rival in vulgarity, cruelty and immorality.

Lebed's encouragement before the capture of a peaceful city was not accidental. Alexander Lebed was striving after Baku, to commit "exploits". In his book "My Life and My Country" he writes, "Press and television were somehow matter-of-factly telling about another slaughter in Baku. Number of victims was mentioned. The international and Soviet public was somehow drowsily protesting. Officers were getting more and more amazed day by day, "There is slaughter in Baku but we are still in Tula." I do not know what efforts Gorbachev was making for a week to stop the bloody discord but then the arguments were probably exhausted and the formula was recalled, "Airborne troops plus military transport aviation is equal to the Soviet power in Transcaucasia." On 18 January, the division was alerted." They were in a hurry to kill the innocent. Tula division will always be cursed in Azerbaijan!

Polotsk and Pskov airborne divisions were keeping up with Tula division, they were as if competing which one of them would make the Azerbaijan land suffer more.

It turns out that those days the military were arriving in Baku on all kinds of occasion. Yuri Voronov, the commander of Kirovograd special brigade that performed its task in the territory of Baku, tells, "By the way, one of my brigade officers was on leave when he heard about our redeployment to Baku and got there on his own." All-army bloody spirit possessed Baku!

The Soviet power failed to hold out in Transcaucasia and another formula remained in history, "Gorbachev plus Primakov, Yazov, Bakatin, Lebed and others is equal to the tragedy of the Azerbaijan people."

It became clear afterwards that General Lebed had begun his disgusting political career with the bloodshed in Baku.

This scoundrel general will say later concerning the tenth anniversary of the State Emergency Committee putsch, "I seized Baku twice (?! - Author) but refused to shoot at the defenders of the White House, at my people." Even then, according to him, the Azerbaijan people was enemy to him.

But the scoundrel general Lebed keeps back the most important and dreadful thing.

V. Platonenko writes, "Answering the questions, Starovoytova expressed her opinion of A. Lebed, "He is a masterful, honest, ambitious man. There are some gaps in his education that are hard to fill in his age, hence his undemocratic views. In such situation (it was also demonstrated by the example of Yeltsin), much depended on the people that surround him. Unfortunately, Lebed is surrounded mainly by stripy Cossacks now… I KNOW FOR SURE THAT IT WAS LEBED'S SUBDIVISION THAT KILLED ABOUT 150 CIVILIANS IN JANUARY 1990 IN BAKU… (highlighted by the author)."

Nikolay Anisin adds, "Then again, it was Lebed, not Primakov, that had two hundred people shot in Baku. Though they say that Primakov was "upset" then."

Baku knows very well how "upset" Primakov was then!

The journalist Y. Ivankova described an expressive exchange of opinions between Lebed and Primakov that indirectly reminds of the role of those two gentlemen in the events of 20 January, 1990 in Baku. The conversation turned to Lebed's thesis: centralization of economic and financial management is the chief source of distrust towards the Centre and can lead to the split in Russia. The tougher centralization, the stronger centrifugal trends. To illustrate his idea, general somehow reminded prime minister that they both had been in Baku, "you as a diplomat and I as a general." Y. Ivankova probably forgets that A. Lebed does not do anything "somehow". He merely reminded Y. Primakov that they both had blood of Bakuvians on their hands, that is was suggesting bloody friendship taking its origin in the capital of Azerbaijan on 20 January, 1990.

In Transdniestria, so as not to parade his bloody deeds, Lebed was acting under the alias Colonel Gusev. While murdering in Baku, he stressed that he is Lebed!

"If it had not been General Lebed (then Colonel - Author) it would have been Ivanov, Sidorov," says A. Mutalibov on TBC channel. We can agree with one reservation: it is difficult to imagine a personality that could be worse than Lebed in his attitude to the Azerbaijani!

A friend of Lebed, the chief of staff of the 59th motorized infantry division Yuri Popov became notorious for looting and particular brutality towards the Azerbaijani in those bloody days. Later, he developed his "business", vividly describing Azerbaijan "atrocities" on Armenian money in his numerous interviews.

The same way was chosen by the dishonoured commander of the 175th division Major General Antonov who had taken part in the introduction of troops in Baku; atrocities of his people, pillage… and numerous interviews about Azerbaijan militants afterwards.

Oksana Gutsalyuk from "Ukraine-Centre" calls Kirovograd special brigade "Kirovograd Bakuvians". "As was mentioned above, there were also special units among the troops brought in Baku in January 1990. "Black January" left its trace in the lives of Kirovograd special brigade soldiers who took part in Baku events as well. The aims set before the brigade in the territory of Baku are revealed by the then commander Yuri Voronov, "On 18 January, 1990 we received the direction of the GRU on the preparation of our brigade for landing in Baku. The team of 500 people formed within 3-4 days was given provisions for autonomous activity for the term of a month, including firewood, water, food stuffs, ammunition… Furthermore, about forty aircrafts were allocated for our use, such number of them can hardly be found in the entire Ukrainian army today. Our aim was to confiscate all the weapons available in the territory of the Azerbaijan capital, to calm down the population. We did not go into the heart of the political situation; the command did not give any ideological explanations or guidelines either. The only thing I know is that just the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict was concerned then and we were to confiscate all weapons to make the further armed clashes between the two sides impossible…"

"The sky of Kirovograd had never seen such a number of military aircrafts taking off every thirty seconds then, nor has it seen this so far," recalls a participant of "Baku campaign" Victor Gerasimenko. "It was a unique redeployment operation. Only the guards stayed on the positions of the brigade… I should say that when we would probably have to use weapon, the line immediately moved up, faces became stern… Though we did not fire a single shot during the entire stay of Kirovagrad brigade in Baku…"

We think that the commander of brigade is not completely sincere, as it is rather difficult to imagine, not a single shot! We should admit, though, that Voroshilov snipers were mainly in the units from the southern regions of Russia.


Tanks were crushing people, transport, any obstacles, firing blank to produce more effect and scare people who were seeing tanks in actions and not in a film for the first time in their lives. BMD-1 was providing aimed fire at civil vessels in the Caspian bay. BMP-2 was providing fire for effect at crowded places from 30mm cannon. "Shilka" was burning flats of citizens and demolishing houses. Add live ammunition and you will have the picture of fascists capturing Soviet cities in the Second World War. The latter were probably even more humane to the civilian population! I nearly forgot another difference between the actions of fascist and Soviet troops. The former were hanging civilians in squares, while the latter finished them with bayonets!

The author has searched for a long time for the information on the victims among civilian population during fascist capturing of Soviet cities. It was found out that several people were killed by stray bullets when fascists were taking Rostov. The grand master I.Z. Bondarevsky told in the fifties that he had easily left the occupied Rostov.

In his book "A Missed Chance", the former prime minister of Ukraine Vitaly Masol writes, "The army was then being exposed to attacks and shocks caused among other things by hasty, unreasoned internal political actions, was drawn into political struggle and ethnic conflicts. Moreover, it was repeatedly exposed to risks, unfairly, unjustly, made guilty though guiltless of others' sins: Tbilisi, Baku, Vilnius, Moscow in the days of the August putsch…"

We are ready to agree with such formulation of the issue and consider guilty only the political leadership of the country, provided that Masol answers the chief questions for Baku. Why did the Soviet Army refuse to fire in Moscow by the order of putschists, whereas it had been killing civilians willingly and intentionally, with particular brutality? Why haven't the supreme command of the Soviet Army that took part in the bloody introduction of troops in Baku repented their doing so far and continue to lie blatantly that they were "fighting" militants etc.? Without giving answers to these questions, the statement of Masol and others is incorrect and unacceptable for Baku.

"They were standing," writes L. Junusova, "with joined hands. "Azadlig!" it thundered over Communist street which will soon lose this name, as well as much that lost sense this night. They did not retreat before armoured troop-carriers and tanks, whose caterpillars had already been ensanguined with blood of those crushed on Tbilisi Avenue, XI Red Army square etc. But even these already blood-stained tanks stopped facing this unprecedented unity. "AZADLIG!"

Our practically unarmed people (what was the use of the weapons of 1941) already stopped tanks of brown fascism 45 years ago. On the night of January, 20th on Baku streets, combat material of red fascism was marching, which had been crushing and bending the people of the Soviet Union since October 1917. It is time we started to tell the people the truth; red fascist terror had begun long before Stalin and it was no other than V.I. Lenin that wrote for the first time about creation of concentration camps, as early as in 1918."

The famous film director Stanislav Govorukhin wrote in his article A Rehearsal? in Moscow News, 18 February, 1990, concerning the introduction of troops in Baku, "On the night of 20th the troops entered the city after all. But the Soviet Army entered a Soviet city … as an army of invaders, under cover of night, on tanks and armoured cars, clearing a way for itself with fire and sword. According to the military commandant, the use of ammunition this night made up 60,000 cartridges.

On the side of Sumgayit road, a motor car with three scientists from Academy of Sciences in it, three professors, one of them woman, stood letting a tank column pass. Suddenly a tank left a column, gnashing caterpillars against metal, ran over car, crushing all passengers. The column did not stop, hurrying to smash "the enemy who had lodged in the city".

Here is a fragment of the report to the USSR Supreme Council made by the People's Deputy Chelyshev V.A. on his stay in Baku from 27 January till 31 January, 1990 in connection with the introduction of the Soviet troops in Baku, "I am afraid that the army "takes the rap" today for the actions of reservists, the so-called "guerrillas", who behave outrageously, shoot at random, who together with officers seized the port warehouse, drank and ate too much of the warehouse products.

They were shooting at office buildings (three floors of "Agroprom" have burned down; there was a fire in State Logistics Committee). They were shooting at the apartment houses near Salyan barracks (mainly retired officers live at that military station it, including Russian ones), shooting ineptly and therefore particularly savagely."

Tanks with "guerrillas" were breaking through obstacles, running into crowds of unarmed people, shooting them from submachine guns. The whole way of the army advancement was been ensanguined with blood of the killed and wounded people. I am not going not retell those interviews with the wounded and citizens of Baku I have seen on videotapes. I will refer only to personal meetings with people…"

Of course, it is an attempt to protect the Soviet Army against the crimes it committed and to lump all the blame on reservists. But it is a naive attempt, since even we hypothetically assume that some were killing and others were watching, responsibility rests with both sides.

Actually, as the numerous facts testify, everyone was killing everyone without choosing!

The most important thing in this report is the character of the introduction of troops in Baku and its "results".




Mamedov Rafik Kerim oglu. 44 Kirov Avenue, 1, born in 1944, Baku, married, 7 children, Azerbaijani, б/п., higher military education, captain 2nd rank in retirement (demobilized after getting injured in Angola), head of the reaction control system, the Ministry of Defence in Baku. The airport, Bina settlement, recorded by Leonov on 1 February, 1990 from a video film, deciphered on 3 February. R. Mamedov reported on the events of the night of 20 January, to the department of internal affairs of Narimanov district of Baku. R. Mamedov's interrogation is carried out on 22 January, 1990 by the assistant to the public prosecutor of Narimanov district Mamedov. In the evening on 19 January, R. Mamedov went to the airport to meet the son who was to arrive from Kuibyshev. On his way there, he saw groups of people talking to one another. Approximately at 1 o'clock in the morning he saw tracer bullets around the airport. 10 minutes later, two wounded were brought to the airport first-aid post. Bullets were explosive, shot from Kalashnikov submachine gun. One was wounded in the side and already dead, the other (Rakhman) was wounded in the shoulder (he was sent to the hospital). Rakhman asked to help those who had been wounded in the same place where he had been himself. They went to Bina and saw a fire made of tyres ahead. Saw the military shooting people point-blank. He saw the wounded being thrown into the canal, crushed with caterpillars. He also saw the wounded being finished with spades and thrown into the fire. R. Mamedov saw one man receiving a burst of submachine-gun fire after which (he was still alive) one of the soldiers, "a husky fellow", threw him into the canal smashing him with a spade. There were no warnings from the military, firing was opened immediately. R. Mamedov saw tanks moving in the direction of the city crushing motor-cars. One of them ran over the oncoming Zhiguli, another smashed another Zhiguli that was turning around. When asked by the assistant prosecutor about the tanks numbers, R. Mamedov answered that it had been possibly Number 391 or 397. There were no patrol cars in front of the tank column. Soldiers were about thirty or thirty-five years old. "We stopped a passing car, they did not let us in Mardakan. We returned to the airport. I met my son. The plane landed 2.55 a.m. Moscow time. Everyone was kept in the airport till 8.00 a.m. (till the end of curfew, according to the military). R. Mamedov repeatedly asked questions but none of the military replied, they did not want to talk. Higher officers would turn away and grin, for example, colonel and major in the airport." As a military expert, R. Mamedov says that both Kalashnikov submachine-guns and Kalashnikov machine-guns had been used. They humiliated both men and women when searched them (moving the legs apart with their own). R. Mamedov did not know about the order on state of emergency issued on 19 January, 1990, and the military in the airport did not inform anyone. When the detained were let out of the airport after 8.00 a.m., R. Mamedov drove on the road seeing crumpled cars with cabins shot through. At the interrogation 22 January, 1990, R. Mamedov says that "he is still in the state of shock."

Airport, Bina settlement. Allegation of the wounded Abasov Abas, Baku, Bina settlement, 3 Khagani Street, Lane 5. Hospital in Maradakan settlement. In the evening of 19 January, 1990, I was walking home. I saw a crowd along the Bina road and came up to them. Getting into the conversation, I saw tanks coming. They suddenly opened fire at the defenceless peaceful people. I was wounded in the leg. When I, an elderly man who had suffered two heart attacks, asked Soviet soldiers to help, they came up and started to kick me with their feet, turned my face to the ground and searched me. Suffering, I was brought to the hospital by the inhabitants of Bina. 29 January, 1990. The original has a signature.

Gala. Allegation of the wounded Kuliyev Vaghif, Baku, Mardakan settlement, 20 Vostok Street. Hospital, Mardakan settlement. On 19 January, 1990, between 10.00 p.m. and 11.00 p.m. tanks appeared at the filling station in Gala village. Without a warning, they opened fire at the defenceless people. At the same time, soldiers went out of ambush, they were close and I could make out their faces. They had long hair, beards, were tall, swore like bargees, shouted, "Turks, ya scum, we'll kill ya all!" They were punishers; I served myself and know that there are no such soldiers in the ordinary army. I was wounded that night and a wounded man was lying beside me. A soldier noticed him and stuck a bayonet into his heart. And then he said to another soldier that they should leave no wounded so as not to leave witnesses. I say once again those were punishing squads. 29 January, 1990. The original has a signature.

The airport road. Allegation of the wounded Aliyev Nadir, Baku, Buzovna settlement. Hospital, Mardakan settlement. On 19 January, 1990, I was driving to the airport together with my cousin. Between 12.00 p.m. and 1.00 a.m. shooting started. I witnesses soldiers shooting in the backs of the people running along the road, people being stabbed with bayonets. The headlights of our car lit faces of the soldiers pretty well. They were very tall, long-haired, bearded. Our car was all shot through. I got four bullets, three of them in the liver, one under my skin. There was a lad lying together with me in the resuscitation department, his name was Fuad, he was from GRES settlement. He was wounded with a bullet and stabbed with a bayonet and died. I saw that night them sending fifty bullets into an already dead man. 29 January, 1990. The original has a signature.

Mustafayev Vaghif Narimanovich, Baku, 28 Builders Avenue, 24, a painter. Salyan barracks. Recorded by Leonov, 27 January, 1990 at the meeting, deciphered on 28 January (the last four paragraphs on 4 February). On the night of 20 January, Mustafayev was lying in bed in his studio located in close proximity to Baku Higher Combined Arms School. He was to be picketing before the school at 2 o'clock in the morning. At 0.10 a.m. he heard heavy fire and screams. He came up to the window looking on Sultanov Street. A crowd was running. (At night the gates of the school, the check-point, was blocked by 50-60 people, let us say, from clothes and shoe factories). It was very dark. A friend of Mustafayev's, Akhverdiyev Ujal Gasan oglu, was also in his studio. The address of the studio is Red East military station, 96. Mustafayev summarizes the accounts of events told by the detained who were sitting in the basement together with him later. First, colonel came out of the gates with a megaphone in his hand and twice warned in Russian that if the people did not disperse, all means would be used. The people did not, the school was blocked by trucks and people. Then the lighting was put out at the school gates, certainly not by the blockers, and there is no street lighting there. When submachine-gun fire began, someone of the picketers threw a Molotov cocktail into a gas tank truck but it turned out to be empty. There was an explosion but without any result. When the crowd dispersed after the shooting, they began fire bullets at people. This is what Khalidshakh told Mustafayev. Later, Mustafayev noticed dents on the house and the asphalt (94 Sultanov Street). They were probably shooting at the asphalt and the bullets ricocheted into people. Akhverdiyev was the first to run to the nearest gates of the school, Mustafayev followed. Shooting was heard from the store. At the school gates Mustafayev asked the officer giving commands to the soldiers to stop shooting. Saying, "You are keeping us from our work", the officer smashed him with his submachine-gun. The blow got him on the ribs (the bandage was applied by father, a surgeon). Leonov saw the bandage, as well as wounds on the fingers, on the legs, bruises on the back and the legs. Moving away from the officer, Mustafayev noticed Akhverdiyev who was lying on the asphalts and two soldiers were standing over him with submachine-guns at the ready (finger on the trigger). The guns were not at half-cock and Mustafayev got scared for his friend. For these soldiers, Mustafayev was merely "a man going from near the school". He was hit on the back with something and heard, "Down!" and he lay down at once beside Alhverdiyev. They searched him while he was lying on the ground, saying mockingly, ""Let's run over them with a car… Let's finish off one… Which one? That bearded or maybe the other?" The lying people were pricked with bayonets (not too deeply), kicked with boots and truncheons. They were saying, "We'll show you for Afghanistan!" People were lying with spread arms and legs ("Legs wider! Arms wider!"). Those lying on the ground blocked the passage through the gates and when (in about an hour) a car approached the school, they were made stand up ("Hands on the nape! Run!"). It turned out that there was a third one lying near, in 5-6 meters. The three of them were driven to the school parade ground. They were searched there ("Down!"), then another six men were brought and laid by their side. This time they were lying on the asphalt about an hour and a half (i.e. two hours in total). Mustafayev said, "Shoot me if you want but I can't lie any more, I've got bad kidneys…" And they made him and Akhverdiyev stand against the APC ("Hands on the armour! Legs wider!"), the rest were lying. The officer allowed Mustafayev stand up. When Mustafayev stood up and the officer went aside, a soldier from the guard approached (about 15 of the were standing with submachine-guns over the lying people). "Who's got bad kidneys? Kolya, hit him on the kidneys!" (not all of them had truncheons). And "Kolya" gave him a powerful blow on the left and then on the right side. (The blows got him over the kidneys, Leonov says that he saw huge bruises.) Moreover, the soldiers were intentionally stepping on the fingers of those lying. Leonov saw a corresponding trace. Mustafayev cannot say for sure, though, if that happened on the parade ground or earlier, at the gates of the school. Their passports were taken away on the parade ground… They were insulted every minute. If anyone said that he had done nothing, he had just been walking home, a hail of blows followed in response. The command was given, "Up! Hands on the nape! Close file double march!" They were all lined up at the entrance to the basement of the school. Then they were searched roughly and hastily (one man got the fly of his trousers torn). The taken was piled in one general heap (money, personal things). Allakhverdiyev's watch tied to the half-belt and taken away by a soldier remained with that soldier for good. They were all brought to the basement that was by no means designed for keeping detainees. A cement room, about 5X5 meter, without lighting and bathroom unit. They were told to ease themselves right on the spot. So they had to drink little, sips of hot tea, they got half a bucket of it at one time. They received no other food for two days. There was nowhere to sleep, no plank beds, nothing fit, just floor, ceiling and walls. There was even no air hole. People were orientating themselves by the feel and voices. Though there were matches and papers, they were not burned, as there was no air. Since the moment they were thrown into the basement they had been "cared about" by the 1st year students with submachine-guns. In the afternoon 20 January, an acquaintance of Mustafayev's, bus driver, was brought there. According to the driver, he was to fly to Moscow that day and he had the ticket in his pocket. His car was stopped at the main entrance to the school. When searching, they found the tricolour of Azerbaijan. Mustafayev heard screams of that driver, Nizami, behind the door of the room where the detainees were kept and is convinced that Nizami was being beaten. Then he was pushed into the common room-cell, brought the flag there (as a kind of material evidence?). The students were spitting on the flag, trampling it down, tearing it with bayonets. The man who came into the "cell" with the students looked like an officer, Mustafayev is sure, but they were saying themselves that he was sergeant. That "chief" suggested sweeping the "cell". The detainees asked for a broom. "Here's your broom," he said, pointing to the flag. They were saying to the detainees through the door, "The city's not yours, the city's taken, now the Russians will live here; everything will be over by the morning." Mustafayev says, "We were imagining the city being shot." They also said (through the door as well) that an APC had just been burned in Tbilisi Avenue, "where nine of our people" and another two were killed. Mustafayev believes that the "information" was based on rumours, since those who told the news did not leave the place at all. They also said, "If there is another message about victims among our people, three of you will be shot." And the detainees, kept in the full dark, believed that (they were locked, not fed, not interrogated, "what if there's war?". The students threatened, "A burst in the upper part of the door, a burst in the middle and in the bottom…" clicking submachine-gun bolts. An hour before the release, food was brought, potato, meat and brown bread. It means, the detainees said, that they are going to keep us long. The second day of the arrest was coming to an end when they were finally led outside so that they could ease themselves under submachine-gun barrels. ("A step aside is equal to escape, I'll shoot without warning!"). Then they were lined up along the wall in the "cell". They were sent for by one, asked about the cause of detention and returned their passports. Everyone was suggested leaving their signature that they had no claim concerning the treatment. And they signed "fearing that they could just not be released." No one knew what happened to them then. The relatives must have thought they were dead. Since the detainees were brought to the basement they had repeatedly asked to notify their relatives, which had always received rude replies and threats of shooting. They were released in the evening of 21 January.

Shikhaliyev Shakhveddin Shekhnabi oglu. Baku, Vishnevka settlement, pas. 149, 4/65. Salyan barracks. Recorded by Leonov on 29 January, 1990 (in the accident hospital), deciphered on 4 February. On the night of 20 Janury, 1990, he was standing in the yard of the hotel not far from Salyan barracks together with friends. They were talking. Then they heard shots that came closer then. With first close shot he was wounded in the leg. The fire was opened without warning by soldiers who suddenly appeared. Whether the shots warning, into the air, Shikhaliyev cannot say. Getting wounded, Shikhaliyev fell down. He tried to rise and was wounded in the other leg, fell again and started fainting. After first shots more people were wounded, Shikhaliyev saw them himself. Many ran away. Soldiers were long-haired, bearded, drunk and swore incessantly. Shikhaliyev was seized by both wounded legs and dragged "like a dead dog". He was dragged for about 500 meter, it seemed to Shikhaliyev that much time had passed. He was trying to keep his head safe by clasping it with his hands (Shikhaliyev is a qualified sportsman, marathoner in the past). He was hurled on the "heap" of bodies; this is how they treated wounded civilians. One man, wounded in the head, said he was dying and asked some water. A soldier pressed submachine-gun barrel to his heart and pulled the bolt. The wounded died at once. The soldiers were saying, "You scum, it's because of you that they disturb us and brought us here." They were swearing at the wounded. Finally someone said, "Remove the scum from here." Five wounded Azerbaijanis were dragged to some other place. They, including Shikhaliyev, were dragged by legs, with heads on the ground, like Shikhaliyev had been dragged earlier. One of the soldiers probably wanted to dress Shikhaliyev's wounded legs but the commander said that they were to help soldiers first. They were brought to some basement in Salyan barracks, narrow concrete room (1.5X7-8 meter). There was a dim light in the dark. Shikhaliyev points out that since the moment he was brought there his conscience had been confused. He suffered severe pain in the legs. He heard voices behind the wall, they were talking in Russian and did not come in to the detainees. On the night of 21 January two Azerbaijani military servicemen came "to the voices" of the prisoners. They said, "Brothers, we'll save you and take you to the hospital." On 21 January, about 11.00 p.m. all five wounded were seated in BMP or BTR (it was a military vehicle any way) and brought in the hospital. They were given first aid and the same night taken to the accidental hospital. The doctor said to Shikhaliyev that he had lost much blood and could have died but for his sportsman's stamina. Shikhaliyev points out that there was no water, no bathroom unit in the basement, nor were the wounded fed. They constantly heard "endless shooting in bursts."

Nuriyev Ilham Allakhverdi oglu, Baku, 39 Darvin Street, 40. XI Red Army Square (now 20 January Square). Recorded by Leonov, 27 January, 1990 at the meeting (deciphered on 28 January). At noon on 19 January he was driving in the area of XI Red Army Square by the car of the People's Front of Azerbaijan. The roads were blocked by buses and cars. They stood there about an hour and a half restoring order so that motor-cars at least could pass. They opened a passage, 3-4 meter width. The witness and his friends had the People's Front bands. There were many locals, children, women, a few young men (about one fifth of all). The witness says that there were no armed people at all, that "blocking" was a demonstrative action to show that the people did not want the troops enter the city, not an actual attempt to stop the troops.

Feyzullayev Nijat Latif oglu, Baku, 28 Builders Street, 22, tel. 380514, film director. XI Red Army Square. Recorded by Leonov, on 30 January, 1990 at the meeting, deciphered on 31 January. Night of 20 January, 0.05 or 0.06 a.m., he remembers the exact time. Feyzullayev heard and saw shooting. At that time he was not far from Spartak Stadium on Tbilisi Avenue. They were shooting from two opposite sides with something leaving red trace. It was not ordinary tracer bullets. Every time something like a red signal rocket flew into the sky. That "rocket" fell to many pieces (a kind of "fireworks"), letting out a specific sound, "sha-sha-sha" (Feyzullayev imitates the sound like that). There were many such deep-red "signal rockets". They were firing them from both sides without stopping, so "it wasn't dark at all". At the same time bursts of submachine-gun fire were heard. "Rockets" crossed in the sky above Feyzullayev. They were launched both from Salyan barracks and Lenin Central Stadium. After the shooting began Feyzullayev stopped a yellow Icarus with 5-6 passengers that was going towards the filling station. (At that time buses in the streets were communication line among picketers). Feyzullayev got on the bus and informed about the shooting. He said that the "front post" (at the filling station) was to be informed as well. Now Feyzullayev believes that the shooting he saw at the stadium was intended to distract the people from other posts. On the night of 20 January the people at the post near the filling station wanted to go to the place where the shooting was heard. But then women shouted that tanks were breaking the fence. The shouts came from the fourth floor of the house at the checkpoint. Obviously, so tanks could enter the city bypassing the pickets. And those who had wanted to go to where there was shooting ran in the different direction, towards the tanks. Feyzullayev walked alone up Tbilisi Avenue to XI Red Army Square. Short of the square, he noticed the obstacle the picketers had made of trolleybuses and buses. The picketers themselves were in XI Red Army Square. At the moment Feyzullayev reached the square, a tank (BMP) rose to the square from the direction of the 3rd microdistrict. Not having met any obstacles or resistance on its way (it was not expected from that direction), the tank stopped in between the road to the 3rd microdistrict and the road to the city (Tbilisi Avenue). Feyzullayev saw the tank in about 15 meters. 7-8 people were sitting on the armour, long-haired, 30-40 years old, some unshaven with rust-coloured bristle. Their faces were totally expressionless, "like puppets". The people were standing on the lawn around the monument and on the foundation of it. There were no "obstacles" in the square, except for several motor-cars. There was also a pile of stones brought there by the picketers (small stones, palm-size). They were not hurled that time. All of sudden, people from the tank (without warning or explanation) opened fire over people's heads, very low. They were obviously shooting from submachine-guns with tracer bullets. Then they began shooting at people and killed some. UAZ took the wounded or killed to the Republican hospital. Before the firing started, the people in the square were saying, "Don't be scared, they won't shoot!" and when it started they were crying, "Don't be scared, they're shooting blank!" The firing lasted about two minutes in total. Then the tank drove to the city along Tbilisi Avenue.

Here are extracts from the letter of Ali Huseynov, a citizen of Baku, four days after that terrible night.

"No one is able to describe what was happening on the night of 20 January in Baku, especially in our districts. I have never seen such a nightmare in any war film. At 11.30 p.m. Rasim and I went up home to have some tea and then come back. At that time the advancement, artillery preparation began; Agasif phoned, he said that tanks had come out of Salyan barracks and were moving to us. Soldiers appeared at the same time as tanks. They were shooting from all sides of the city. About a thousand soldiers were lining up on the crossroads not far from our place (S. Vasilevich plant). People, the young, women and children (they did not leave despite the demand of the People's Front of Azerbaijan) were standing along the streets.

"Our" Red Army opened heavy fire from submachine-guns, machine-guns from armoured personnel carriers. They aimed guns at houses, lighting the windows with searchlights, shooting at flats. How can I describe what I saw? We, Rasim, Alladin and I were looking through the windows; a bullet got right into ours.

Now I want to tell about the courage of my people. I saw young men seize burning sticks and rush towards soldiers under bursts of machine-gun fire. They were falling, taking the sticks again, coming right to the searchlights and shouting, "Are you inhuman? Why are you killing us?" Ambulances come and our army shoots at them. Directly. Bullets were raining till morning. They were moving towards the centre. People came into the streets, blood was flowing in springs; corpses were collected at night under bullets… A Russian woman from our house was wounded, she lives on the tenth floor. In the house opposite two people were killed in their flats…"

Here is one of dozens of thousands evidences of Bakuvians, it is so typical, "Scenes of the bloody morning of 20 January, 1990 flashed before my eyes. Streets of Baku covered with blood and studded with corpses. Lines of tanks and APC slowly moving along the streets of the tormented city. THOUSANDS of carnations showered by Bakuvians on the pools of blood on the asphalt. There was much of it, blood. I wonder whether there were more flowers or blood. Everything was melting into one red colour. And I remembered FURY. Dreadful, inhuman fury penetrating each cell of the body and electrifying it. Soldiers were all around. Russian soldiers. Drunk, stinking, unshaven, unkempt, with vacant faces, not a host but riffraff. They entered the peaceful city at night, pouring heavy fire on the streets, without choosing, from submachine-guns and heavy machine-guns from APC, shooting in the windows of houses, crushing ambulances, shooting at nurses, so very young girls who rushed from their dormitory to help dress wounds of the people. They were shooting unarmed people. People that were coming back home from their friends'. They spared neither the old nor children. I remembered the fury. And shock. We, the Azerbaijani, were the first to face that bloody bacchanalia the civilized, so-called "Christian world with new thinking" brought and is still bringing to us. When one of those fighting-cocks stopped me and demanded that I show my documents, the fury inside me broke through. I threw my passport into his face and spat upon him. I do not remember what I was shouting."

26 June, 1990
N 432
(370013, BAKU)
Comrade Karaev T.E.

                                      To Your out. N150 27.02.1990
I inform You that on 26 January 1990 in the area of Lenkoran, a group of extremists armed with fire arms made an attack on the division of airborne troops. The commander of the division Senior Lieutenant KONOPLEV A.V. was killed.

The group of extremists was dispersed as a result of the applied means; the most active participants of the armed attack in number of over 40 people have been arrested. Among the ar-rested there was ABDULLAYEV TARIZI GAJIBALA oglu, born in 1965, native and inhabitant of the town of Lenkoran.

On the same day the arrested were delivered in Baku by helicopter. Before boarding the helicopter, for the purpose of preventing potential resistance in the process of transportation, the detainees were tied up with special holds on the necks, in accordance with Instruction of individ-ual training of intelligence officers.

On the way to Baku, several of the detainees tried to stand up and disentangle themselves from the ties, in which connection the others fell. ABDULLAYEV turned out to be at the bot-tom. The cause of death was mechanical asphyxia due to the strangulation of the neck with the loop.

In connection with Lenkoran events proceedings have been instituted.
At present, the investigation is in progress.

The head of the investigating group
of the General military prosecutor's office
Colonel Justice


A. Fadeyev writes in his novel "The Young Guard" that when fascists executed Oleg Koshevoy he shouted in the faces of his murderers, "It is not you that are dreadful, dreadful is what gave birth to you!"
Only a man who sold his soul to the devil could write that.
Soviet justice gave birth to such people as Colonel Justice V. Medvedev!
In the war years, fascists suffocated prisoners with exhaust gases spending certain amount of petrol for that. Application of Instruction of individual training of intelligence officers does not even require spending any petrol. Improved technique!

Victor Nikolaev who openly supports the actions of the Soviet Army in Baku writes, "Twenty minutes later Victor was spat over. His Ural braked on the pavement. There was a strange fuss. He jumped out of the cabin to find out why the handful of people was so agitated. Squeezing himself into the centre he got it all at one time. An Azerbaijani woman clutched his chest tightly, braying hysterically in a kind of untranslatable tongue-twisters, endlessly spitting right on his face. No one of those surrounding her even stirred. Everyone bristled up but kept quiet. They were standing as if rooted in the ground, glowering. Officers and soldiers jumped up and quickly cooled the common flare by standing up each beside each of the locals. And then all of them were screaming. The eight Russians were acting clearly by the order, they did not touch anyone, raised their collars, clenched their fists white and were also yelling (Azerbaijanis, as Victor Nikolaev says, were yelling with grief but why were "the eight Russians"? - Author). In about ten minutes everyone was tired of screaming. An elderly Azerbaijani man, breathing nois-ily and calming down easily, held Victor's both hands as if afraid that the latter would go away and began speaking quickly in a mild dull voice, "Don't get angry, son, her son and grandson were killed a week ago. She though it was you… They were in camouflage, too."

The woman pressed her lips together and looked at all officers, crying voicelessly with open eyes. The elderly Azerbaijani tried to soothe her, telling her something, cuddling her. Poor devils, why is it so hard for everyone? Is there anyone kind and not sad… Warrant officer Lekha sat beside him and rubbed his shoulder wincing badly now and then. He hurt his when jumping on the fly out of the body, in a hurry to help Victor.

"Come on, stop rubbing it, it'll only get worse," somehow men started feeling relieved at once. "It'll be OK by your wedding day."

Lekha stopped immediately and sat with a blank look for several seconds, "But I'm already married!"

The laughter did not die out till the port…"

Blood and laughter!

"On returning to the quarters, officers argued until fighting started. For half an hour, they were grappling with one another, then separating one another. Sashka went hysterical; he was tied up and laid on the floow. He was still bursting to kill that man and shouted, "What am I to do with it?! I've seen war! Even in Afghanistan they didn't curse me so…" The patrol came run-ning and got it, too. Then Sashka was weeping violently like a child. The others were also twist-ing their mouths. And then they all tried to cheer up Sashka awkwardly, poured spirit, taking something with it. Everything was lousy, not in a human way, not in a Russian way." Yes, it was not in a Russian way, not in a human way!

Son and grandson killed at one time, a maddened woman, clenched fists of Soviet soldiers, fights, carousals, Homeric laughter and insane spree of the occupants… such was the reality Azerbaijan was facing.

On 25 January, 1990, the author together with his friends was meeting in Bina airport sev-eral foreign correspondents arriving in Baku. All of a sudden, a huge military car appeared and a lively captain got out. "Stand here," he commanded to the driver, "I'm going to meet the guys." "It's prohibited to stand here," the driver objected. "But you will," countered the lively captain. "What if they want me to get out of here?" continued the driver. "Shoot to kill," finished the lively captain and disappeared in the dark.

It was not an empty threat. On 24 January, 1990, on the 22nd km of Baku-Sumgayit high-way, an armoured personnel carrier ran over a Zhiguli; Doctor of Chemistry, the head of Or-ganochlorine Synthesis Institute of the Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences, Professor Svetlana Hamid gizi Mamedova and the head of the department at the same institute, Doctor of Chemistry Ibrahim Ismail oglu Ibrahimov were killed on their way to work.

Here is a cynical and immoral response of the deputy military prosecutor Colonel Justice Klimov to the death of innocent people.

28 June, 1990
№ 444
(370013, BAKU)
Comrade Abasov M.T.
Narimonov Avenue

In response to N1220, 9 June, 1990, I inform You that a criminal case was instituted on 26 February, 1990 based on the death of Mukhtarov Rasim Mustafa oglu.

In the process of investigation, I has been established that on the night of 26 February of this year, during the curfew, Mukhtarov R.M. was driving Moskvich-412 N I 66-08 A3 motor-car at a speed of 80-90 km/h along Taghi-zade Street.

The sentry of control post N2 Private OZERNY A.V. came out on the lighted roadway and gave a warning signal with a baton to stop the car.

However, Mukhtarov did not yield to the demand, moreover, he turned the car directly to OZERNY.

The latter managed to save his life by jumping aside.

Seeing that MUKHTAROV had made an attempt to run over OZERNY, sentries SHUS-TOV and USACHEV gave warning submachine-gun shots into the air with the purpose to detain the offender; however, MUKHTAROV did not respond and tried to disappear from the scene of the incident. In this connection, the above-mentioned persons opened fire at the car and MUK-HTAROV got a mortal gunshot wound.

On the strength of all the collected evidence, it has been established that Private SHUS-TOV A.Y. and Private USACHEV I.A. were acting lawfully and in this view, the criminal case against these persons is closed on the basis of Clause 10 Item 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Azerbaijan SSR for lack of corpus delicti.

Deputy military prosecutor

Colonel Justice


Even with great reserve, those soldiers that killed an unarmed man and Klimov that de-fends them cannot be called humans.

Another "record" of the contemporary history was set on 20 January, 1990 in Baku; for the first time after the fascists, Soviet soldiers were firing at ambulances and said that it had been… extremists that had been shooting.

21 January, 1990
№ 38
(370013, BAKU)

                                To Your out. N SKES 2006, 9 January, 1990
I inform You that the investigation of the case of the mass disorders in Baku city has established that individual citizens died at the hand of extremists.

SEMENOV A.V. was killed by extremists from a passing car on the night of 20 January, 1990.

Emergency doctor MARKHEVKA A.V. was killed by extremists on Artem - Baku road.

In similar circumstances, militia officers BOGDANOV Z.Z. and ISRAILOV A.A. were killed and MIRZOYEV O.M. sustained grave bodily injuries.

The head of the investigating group
of the General military prosecutor's office
Colonel Justice


It seems that talking about extremists, Medvedev meant Soviet soldiers, there can be no other reasonable explanation.

The Soviet troops were killing Azerbaijani militiamen only for their desire to help their compatriots.


of unlawful acts of military personnel
towards officers of internal affairs of the Azerbaijan SSR

Drawn up by Aliyev D.M.

The materials submitted to the deputy investigating commission indicate that after the introduction of troops in the territory of Baku, declaration of state of emergency on 19-20 January, 1990, military personnel allowed and continues to allow unlawful acts towards officers of internal affairs of the republic.

In particular, on 20 January of this year, approximately at 11.00 p.m., near a call office on Lenin Avenue, Baghirov Telman Malik oglu, born in 1960, militiaman of the Internal Affairs Department of 26 Baku Commissars district was severely wounded in the heart area and died after being taken to Semashko hospital. The findings of the commission that investigated the fact of death of Baghirov T.M. indicate that on 20 January, approximately at 09.00 p.m., in the period of declaration of emergency in Baku, the security militiaman of the Internal Affairs Department of 26 Baku Commissars district, still wearing uniform after work, was near the call office on Lenin Avenue by Drujba cinema when he was suddenly fired upon from automatic arms by unidentified military servicemen, as a result of which he sustained several grave bullet wounds and was taken to Semashko hospital where he died before he was rendered medical aid.

The death of Baghirov Telman Malik oglu was recognized as a mortal result of the execution of official duty.

An extract from the medical record demonstrates that the cause of death of Baghirov Telman Malik oglu was the bullet wound in the area of chest with injury of the heart.

It proceeds from the review by the results of the official investigation of the fact of death and injuring of the officers of the 7h Department of the Azerbaijan SSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, that approximately at 07.00 a.m., 20 January of this year, the task force consisting of Lieutenant Israilov Agagnazar Araz oglu, born in 19*, Bogdanov Valery Zakirovich, born in 1958, Captain Mirzoyev Oktay Mekhti oglu and Gurbanov A., while driving a service car in the execution of the official duty at the intersection of Inglab Street and Tbilisi Avenue, got under automatic arms fire of military details. As a result, Israilov A.A. and Bogdanov V.Z. were killed and Mirzoyev O.M. had left arm amputated.

The commission regards the death of Lieutenant Israilov Agagnazar Araz oglu, Bogdanov Valery Zakirovich and the disability of Mirzoyev Oktay Mekhti oglu as a result of the execution of official duty.

The district militia officer of Oktyabrsky District Department of Internal Affairs of Baku Captain Bayramov Imamali Soltan oglu was killed on 31 March, 1990, at 10.00 p.m., near Chermet settlement in his personal car, Zhiguli N5570 AGC.

The cause of death of Bayramov I.S. was traffic violation on the part of the driver of an APC without identification signs.

Approximately at 12.00 p.m., the stepdaughter of Safarov Badafar Agamirza oglu, born in 1923, veteran of the Great Patriotic War, Veteran of Labour, phoned him from Karaev children's hospital and told that the military were shooting around and the wounded and killed were brought in the hospital.

Safarov B.A. became anxious and drove his personal car Moskvich-412 N A 87-99 AG to Karaev hospital. He was killed not far from Salyan barracks in uncertain circumstances. His body was found on 20.01.90 in Teze Pir mosque.

The record of the external examination of body established that Safarov Badafar Agamirza oglu, born in 1923, died as a result of a gunshot in the area of right thigh surface with a rising wound tract.

On 20 January, 1990, at 00.30 p.m., near Nakhchivan hotel, Abulgasanov Ilgar Yusif oglu, born in 1967, militia officer of Oktyabrsky District Department of Internal Affairs, was fired on his way home from work in his personal GAZ-24 motor-car by military details and severely injured, as a result of which died of a gunshot.

On 20 January of this year, near Salyan barracks, Huseynov Vidadi Alyar oglu, born in 1966, and Mekhtiyev Musa Isa oglu, born in 1966, militia officers of the internal affairs department of Baku Underground were severely injured; Sergeant Major of the 4th militia patrol duty company Babayev Abdurakhman Gajibala oglu was beaten up with truncheon by a military detail on 20.01.90.

On 20 January of this year, traffic regulation officers Sergeant Osmanov T.A., Abdulazizov A.A., Allakhverdiyev Y.B. were taken to Salyan barracks in the patrol car 14-10 AGA by a military detail, beaten up and kept in the disciplinary cell for 3 days.

Apart from the above-mentioned, other cases of unlawful acts on the part of military personnel occurred in the territory of the republic.

These cases could make up several volumes!

The atrocities of the Soviet troops in Baku on 20 January, 1990 became an "eradication measure".

Before the storm of the TV tower in Vilnius, the commander of "Alfa" Colonel (later General) V. Karpukhin said, "We must kill as many of them as possible, like in Baku."

(The author of this suggestion, the murderer of Amin, was the head of guards of the Kazakhstan president Nazarbayev for a long time after the USSR collapse).

The introduction of troops in Baku was also another measure. A member of the Military Council of Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Major General A. Gritsenko said that "in the assessment of the possible developments we proceed, as a rule, from a precedent. January events in Azerbaijan were unique", in other words, all state power was thrown on a peaceful city for the first time in contemporary history.

In connection with this "decade" of the Soviet troops in Azerbaijan, with a sore heart, the author recalls the decade of Russian culture in Azerbaijan in 1969 in which he took part. The decade was to last one week but members of the delegation, which were several hundred in number, did not want to leave the hospitable Azerbaijan and the good hosts did not want to let them go. Who could assume then that this decade would turn into the bloody "decade" of Baku twenty years later!

The warships of the Red Banner Caspian Fleet also entered the sea "battle"; they tried to sink merchant ships of Caspian Steamship Company.

"We were convinced that the warships were actually attacking those civilian vessels," writes People's Deputy of the USSR Arif Melikov. "There were also attempts to sink some of them. Many vessels had their decks and top-hamper shout through. Cheleken-1, Vodoley-4, Aktau, 40th Anniversary of VLKSM, Neftegaz-10, Neftegaz-18, Neftegaz-64 were damaged particularly badly. Fire began on the board of Vodoley-4 whose captain was Yulian Alexandrovich Radchenko. That ship was damaged in three spots."

SOS was broadcast in Baku air, from the bay, for the first time since the Second World War (when it was sent from the burning Agamali tanker attacked by enemy aircrafts), due to the attack of warships. The special issue of Rachel daily, 20-26 January, reported that one of the broadcasts from ships "Attention to everyone!" said in particular,

"Peaceful population of Earth!

On 22 January, the military commandant of Baku ordered using weapons of warships against civilian ships… Before the eyes of the international community their artillery fired at Aktau motor ship, ships Neftegaz-10, Neftegaz-18, Neftegaz-64, 40th Anniversary of VLKSM, Neftegaz-3."

On 21 January, immediately after the introduction of troops, Yazov holds a meeting to which he invites the district military commandants of Baku. "When Yazov entered the meeting room with his entourage, little time passed," recalls one of the participants of that meeting, "till it was impossible to breathe because of vodka reek. Yazov himself, with red swollen mug, walked staggering slightly, - didn't sleep the whole night, as he explained. Hardly had the participants taken their seats when Yazov began… reciting a poem. "Whose poem is this?" he asked the audience. "Mayakovsky", someone cried out from his seat. "Well done," reacted Yazov and continued, "So are we to find and burn down People's Front organizations."

It became known afterwards that Yazov's poetic burst at the meeting had had some reasons. Instead of defending Motherland, he wrote poems. Another meeting, late in the evening of 22 January, was held by the USSR Defence Minister General of the Army D.T. Yazov with a group of Moscow "journalists".

"At present," Yazov said, "about 80 extremist representatives of the People's Front, informals (the entire USSR swarmed with informals then) have been arrested. Each of them will be dealt individually and the degree of guilt of each of them will be determined. However, our aim is not to detain everyone but to crash the established structure of power at all facilities and in all institutions.

It was not a slip of the tongue, I said exactly "power". They were preparing to seize it and very so convinced in success that declared state of emergency themselves as early as at 11.00 p.m. on 18 January, before the introduction of troops in Baku. Soviet and party bodies in many districts of the city had actually lost control over the situation by that moment. A meeting was scheduled for 20 January where the transfer of power to the People's Front was to be declared.

I will give you figures. According to our estimates, there are about 40,000 militants under arms in Azerbaijan, with submachine-guns, different rifles, machine-guns and sporting guns. Now, when informals were detained, the district department of the People's Front was searched and even sets of military uniform were found, from soldier's to general's. Many extremist informals went underground and it is not an easy task to reveal them in a city with a two million population."

The ideology of this speech was taken one-to-one from Goebbels's office. "The Czechs kill Germans in Sudeten, the Polish attacked Germany and destroyed a settlement etc."

More red-faced than usual, he was making contradictory statements, confusing names, districts of Baku, figures etc. At the end of the press conference he said, "I promise you as a Communist that I will restore the Soviet power as soon as possible" and left.

Varennikov echoes Yazov. "To our regret, the militants are armed not only with sporting guns and Molotov cocktail but also with up-to-date submachine-guns, machine-guns and even grenade launchers," lied the deputy minister of the USSR Minister of Defence, Commander-in-Chief Land Forces General of the Army V. Varennikov in the pages of "Izvestiya" on 21 January, 1990. He never repeated that again; as the further events demonstrated, he proved to be more decent than Gorbachev!

The occupying authority was established in Baku occupied by the Soviet troops, as is common in such cases. Here are the names of the chief occupants.

Dubinyak V.S.. - military commandant of Baku;
Major General Solodkov V.D. - deputy commandant;
Major General Kirilyuk A.I. - deputy commandant for political affairs;
Colonel Sabusov V.V.- head of the staff;
Colonel Lyakh P.I. - deputy administrative commandant;
Lieutenant Colonel Turkin A.M. - deputy head of the staff for aviation;
Colonel Yarovoy Y.N. - communications officer;
Colonel Rubtsov I.N. - commandant of 26 Baku Commissars district;
Colonel Bondarev P.T. - commandant of Oktyabrsky district;
Colonel Korolkov V.N. -commandant of Nasimi district;
Lieutenant Colonel Lisyuk R.I. - commandant of Narimanov district;
Colonel Ponomarev B.V. - commandant of Kirov district;
Lieutenant Colonel Tolmachev V.V. - commandant of Lenin district;
Colonel Buntsev A.P. - commandant of Nizami district;
Lieutenant Colonel Stolyarov A.A. - commandant of Khatai district;
Major Demidov B.A. - commandant of Ordzhonikidze district;
Lieutenant Colonel Dzantiyev K.B. - commandant of Karadag district;
Colonel Boyko M.G. - commandant of Azizbekov district;
Major Tikhonov - commandant Bina airport
Even after the collapse of the USSR, when considerable amount of time passed, none of the above-mentioned did not repent their doings or at least admitted that there were no militants in the streets of Baku but only peaceful citizens, thereby taking a part of the blame on themselves!

Quite remarkable is the structure of subdivisions set up in full accordance with war time: deputy commandant for political affairs, deputy administrative commandant, deputy head of the staff for aviation, communications officer. The name of deputy head of tank subdivision was kept in secret for some reasons, the same tank subdivision that had been trampling civilians; the only thing that lacked to complete the war time set was artillery unit!

Probably, they decided to wait a little with artillery preparation!

However, the main element, armed enemy, was unavailable, so Marshal Yazov used the expression "People's Front organizations". And where there are "organizations", there is the necessity for rear services support, aviation, communication etc.

There are many disgraceful pages in the history of the Soviet Army (for instance, Tukhachev's annihilation of Tambov peasants with chemical warfare, G. Zhukov's order to take the offensive across minefields) but the invasion in Baku is unprecedented in the world practice (the American army annihilated the Indians, though, but the latter had at least arrows).

In accordance with the rules of any gangster capture, the occupants immediately paralyzed the city depriving the authorities of the chance to send objective information about the events in Baku.

When the troops were brought in, as is common for the occupation of the enemy's city which the Soviet troops deemed Baku, they immediately seized television and General A.I. Ovchinnikov became boss there, an officer of the Political Department of the USSR Armed Forces, deputy of the USSR Supreme Council. TV screens were dead for a long time in the republic.

The political analyst Novruzogly managed to obtain the shorthand record of the talks between the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Council Soviet of Nationalities Y. Primakov and the secretary of the CPSU CC A. Ghirenko and the head of international relations department of the Central Committee V. Mikhailov. All three of them were in Baku on the eve of the January tragedy with the purpose of "stabilizing the situation" in the capital of Azerbaijan. Below is given a fragment of that conversation which took place on 19 January, 1990 at 06.30 p.m.

"A. Ghirenko: "The population in the regions and towns of Azerbaijan is not to be aware of what is going on in Baku. The troops are entering the city. There is an order already."

Y. Primakov: "People get all information from television."

V. Mikhaylov: "We must cut the communication."

And the power unit of Azerbaijan television was blown up.

Komsomolskaya Pravda interviewed Victor Romanov, a technician, who had miraculously escaped death, hiding at his friends' and relatives'. He told, "I came to work on 19 January at 07.00 p.m. About fifteen minutes later, four armed soldiers entered the workshop. They began inquiring about the power supply diagram, opening cells of communication cables, asked other questions. Then they said, "Commandant calls you." My workmate and I were led to the basement and under the guard of other soldiers. They went back themselves. Several minutes later, I heard a muffled explosion. We were not allowed to go out for about hour. Then they made us change in the military uniforms ("for your own safety") and convoyed to the nearby building of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Council."

The letter of the then first deputy of prosecutor of Azerbaijan SSR M. Babayev to the Chief Military Prosecutor of the USSR Lieutenant General Justice V.F. Katusev proves the involvement of the KGB special group in the power unit explosion in the television and radio centre. "The explosion of the power unit could be arranged and performed as a special measure on preventing unauthorized broadcasting of materials on behalf of the People's Front, which is confirmed by the KGB inspection record N 125/B, 17 January, 1990, saying that the KGB "works out special measures" on preventing the capture and usage of the television and radio centre by the representatives of the People's Front of Azerbaijan. In this connection, the version about the involvement of the KGB officers in the arrangement of the explosion is to be checked by the organs of the military prosecutor's office…"

The line at that issue was drawn twelve years later by Vyacheslav Morozov. He write in his article FSB Admiral, "Army units entered Baku (the FSB Admiral Ugryumov was opposed to the introduction of troops); the government of Azerbaijan regarded it as an act of aggression and began to prepare an appeal to the people. Ugryumov realized that if the appeal was broadcast, mass disorders would be inevitable (?! - Author). There would be much blood (?! - Author). He was aware of the meaning and the tone of the appeal.

The television centre was guarded by troops but members of the government and deputies had the right of unimpeded access to its territory. THE SPECIAL GROUP OF THE KGB ENTERED IT UNIMPEDED, TOO (highlighted by the author). Appreciating the people's property (?! There is no limit to these gentlemen's cynicism. - Author), the officers of A group cut the power cable with one small charge, switching off the republican television broadcasting for several days. The appeal was not sent, new blood was not shed (?! - Author)."

The point of the matter is not this moronic concoction but that it is journalists related to the Russian secret services who have been writing about the true organizers and performers of the explosion in Baku television centre for more than ten years!

So eloquently, to the entire country, did Gorbachev lie soon after the introduction of troops on the central television, saying that the explosion had been performed by the People's Front extremists! Ryzhkov, Primakov, Bakatin, Krtuchkov, Yazov and others alleged the same. All Soviet mass media were trumpeting to the whole USSR. And here it is, the confession that totally clarifies the issue. There will be much more such confessions in the future!

In Baku, Bakatin had loyal cutthroats in his special service.

Vladimir Verzhbitsky writes in the article Will the City Be Left without Guard?, "On 1 December of this year, in accordance with order N 033, 10.10. 2001 signed by the minister of internal affairs Boris Gryzlov, the detached special motorized battalion of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia quartered in Penza will be liquidated.

This subdivision 6556, popularly known as militia battalion, has a glorious battle record. Here are just several landmarks. 1980 - maintenance of public order during Olympic Games in Moscow, 1985 - the same task at the XII International Festival of Youth and Students, 1990 - suppression of disorders in Balu and settlement of ethnic conflict, 1991 - service in Nagorno-Karabakh where the fighters of the battalion were a "human shield" at the dividing line between the Armenian and the Azerbaijani troops, 1993 - resistance to extremists in Dagestan, 1994-2001 - performance of special battle tasks in Chechnya and Dagestan.

The battalion has always been a good guard of the city and the region. Over 100 soldiers went into the streets of Penza on duty daily. Fighters of the battalion secured carrying out of any mass events. Besides, it was the only paramilitary structure capable to come to the spot in case of mass disorders."

We are not going to estimate the activity of the "detached special motorized battalion of internal troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Russia quartered in Penza"; it is not by any means our aim, but we know much from the eyewitnesses' evidence concerning its activity in 1990 in Baku, "suppression of disorders in Balu and settlement of ethnic conflict". This battalion was the "chief striking force" of Bakatin. It was they who were making numerous arrests and night searches by Bakatin's order. They were noted for peculiar brutality towards the peaceful citizens of Baku. Bakatin was apple-polishing Gorbachev with his brutality, and the battalion was apple-polishing Bakatin.

Since 12 January, the militia battalion from Stavropol was deployed in Baku, headed by Captain Edward Nemytko and Captain Edward Golovko who were apathetically watching the disorders. The battalion got down to "work" after the invasion of the Soviet troops in Baku; it got involved in racketeering and blackmail, mainly in storehouses, shops, restaurants etc.

It must be said that "Bakatin's nestlings" left a noticeable "trace" in Baku.

Alexey Vasilyev describes this riffraff that occupied Baku.

First, several words about Alexey Vasilyev himself. He served in Chichik, Afghanistan, Baku with the 8th battalion of the 22nd OBrSpN (detached special brigade, a special unit of the KGB).

"Morning. I walk around the vicinity. Infantrymen are warming themselves at the fire by the tank, shooting from time to time at the nearby houses, without spirit. They turned out to be "guerillas from Rostov". Such imposing guys. But not fighters at all… Not fighters.

A bearded man comes up to me, he is in charge. "Son, I see you're serviceman, they gave us submachine-guns, grenades… But what are we to do? Oh, you're not even wearing a bullet-proof vest, so special units need no armour!"

When I look more closely, I get ill at ease. What a scum they have brought in Baku!

The actions of the reservists, Rostov soldiers from Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir Sakovsky's battalion, reeked of some kind of madness. They were running, shouting fervently, shooting at windows and balconies of dwelling houses, into the air and so on. Finally, soldiers from Salyan barracks opened fire at them, taking them for militants. And as one would expect, they immediately ran following their nose!

That "host" was gathered again with great difficulty afterwards!

After the night tank attack with infantry support against the civilians of Baku, Armenian servicemen were taken out of Baku from military airfields, in increased secrecy.

We know today that on 16 January, 1990, by Gorbachev's order, the urgent conscription of reservists from Krasnodar, Stavropol and Rostov regions and their redeployment to Baku began.

Numerous eyewitnesses of the events of 20 January, 1990 say that there were a considerable number of Armenians in the ranks of the Soviet Army that invaded Baku. They were all hastily mobilized from Rostov and Krasnodar region. At the session of the USSR Supreme Council one of NKAO leader Dadamyan said that the slaughter committed by the Soviet Army in Baku on 20 January, 1990 was the punishment for Sumgayit events.

It refers in full measure to Armenian mercenaries in the Soviet Army that invaded Baku.

The first secretary of Krasnodar regional committee of the party Polozkov said in an interview to Komsomolskaya Pravda that the mobilization for the operation in Baku had been carried out by a group of high-ranking officers from Moscow.

The local authorities were not admitted to this top secret action.

Salekh bey writes, "Moreover, he did not disdain even the support of so-called zinvors, Dashnak volunteers recruited to guard the property of Armenian businessmen in Baku. In Baku, soldiers of Armenian origin arriving from Astrakhan, Port-Petrovsk, Krasnovodsk were held back under different pretences. Military equipment and ammunition addressed to the Soviet government were delivered by steamships from Persia and Krasnovodsk which were passed to dashnaks. Mantashev plant and other facilities of Armenian industrialists were used as weapons depots."

On 20 January, 1990, 70 years later, Gorbachev applied this method again by bringing Armenians from the southern regions of Russia.

This action caused a sharp protest among the local Russian population which was then hushed up by the USSR mass media. The aid of the USSR president Gorbachev Chernyayev A.S. says that "…after Lithuania and in connection with the events in Azerbaijan which by the way caused a furious women march in Krasnodar, Stavropol, Rostov-on-Don, Tuapse, Cossack villages and Russian peasant villages in protest against the recruitment of reservists sent to "suppress the Caucasus".

At the meeting in the CPSU CC, a worker of a mining face from a mine in Rostov region Leonid Krivenda was telling with indignation, "We in Rostov region were badly affected by the latest rash order about the mobilization of reservists due to the state of emergency in Baku. There are killed and wounded among our conscripted reservists; probably even in 1937 people were not taken in this way, at night, with militia cars. Our people's reaction is very ambiguous. There were strikes in the mines. Women were outraged, they crowded the main street. I asked Mikhail Sergeyevich a question, who was the author of this action, after all, there was no mobilization order and just the resolution on emergency measures to restore law and order in Baku. Who made the decision on mobilization then? He admitted, yes, we messed it up here, but he never mentioned a definite person that had made the decision."

As early as the next day, 21 January, rotation of the intruding troops began. Rotation in troops is a common thing. For instance, almost all special militia squads from different regions of Russia have been in Chechnya, replacing one another. The minimal period of service in Chechnya was not less than half a year, according to the Russian press. Rotation in the Soviet troops that occupied Baku began on the next day after the invasion. Eyewitnesses told afterwards that transport aircrafts landed nearly on one another's tail-ends, arriving and taking off with full boards of soldiers. What was the point of such rapid rotation? The point was that the organizers of this operation were trying to cover up their tracks sending back those who had "distinguished themselves" most, among whom were (and there is indisputable proof) ethnic Armenians, and new ones were brought in instead. After a certain period of time, many officers and soldiers swore by God that they had not been in Baku on 20 January.

In this respect, the answers of the military commandant of Baku Lieutenant General of internal troops V.S. Dubinyak to the following questions is rather typical.

"Was there any alternative of the introduction of troops in the city and why did the troops enter at night, why were not they brought already in the days of Armenian pogroms, why did the introduction of troops begin at 0.20 a.m., while the resolution on the introduction was broadcast at 5.30 a.m.?"

Dubinyak: "I am not going to answer these questions. I was appointed military commandant after the introduction of the troops." In private conversations, however, Dubinyak used to say that he had arrived in Baku after the well-known events with another contingent of forces.

To cover up as many tracks of crimes as possible is the primary and sole reason of such rapid rotation! It had no military aim.

We saw rapid rotation caused by military necessity in the Chechen war, when military aircrafts were incessantly landing and taking off in Khankala airport; but they were bringing fresh soldiers, officers, military equipment, ammunition etc. and taking the wounded, killed and those who had gone insane. A war was going there.

In his article Baku. 1990… the hack writer of the Soviet Army Alexey Vasilyev writes, "A submachine-gun burst… another one… crackle, no, hail of submachine-gun fire… Colonel grasps the flack with spirit fussily and disappears. A stray bullet flies into the window, slightly ruining the interior. Here it is… relaxation on the carpets… I try to figure out what is going on. The gates of Salyan barracks swing open and a tank rolls out of them crushing the wretched barricade, infantry follows in a line. The infantry does not save cartridges, fires upwards from submachine-guns, stumbling upon the splinters of the barricade, bullets fly God knows where, the townsfolk scatter."

Mr. Vasilyev's reference to God is irrelevant here; the infantry did not save cartridges, shooting at civilians!

Provocative information appeared in Krasnaya Zvezda, that "a group of armed militants disguised as servicemen of the Soviet Army fired upon peaceful passers-by on Lenin Avenue with the purpose to provoke hatred…" The material was signed, "Military commandant of the city Colonel General Dubinyak." There is a great number of such Goebbels-like examples, adjusted for the locale and period.

The performance of "duty" by the Soviet fascists is demonstrated by the following radio interception.

"…I'm picking up… 95 people killed…

…Huh, ten years is nothing to sort out that mess. All the rest slipped in front of our barracks, there's hospital there, then a building. Yeah, there it is…

…One civilian box today, they fuckin' banged from a cannon on the bay, damn.

…But only three were run over. Just shot down in the morning, firing right at the seaport…

…They were taking Civil People's Front, those guys had time to fuck off but then I fuckin' struck with a missile from the gun… Only three were run over there…

…It's quiet now, our guys thrashed the People's Front…

'Kerosene, Skachok, I'm Kurgan, over

'It's Skachok-33. Over.'

'You're like fishwives, stop flapjaw on the air, shut up and just report…'"

For the first time after Afghanistan, military helicopters Mi-24 were used during the introduction of troops in Baku in January 1990.

Lebedev's thugs gave a "battle" to civil ships… With the shortest possible delay, the division headquarters planned the operation; I set the mission on the capture of the seaport buildings to the commander of Kostroma regiment Colonel Y.Y. Savilov.

…By 7.00 a.m. the regiment had taken the seaport without casualties on either side. The first-class (build in Finnish shipyards) steamship Sabit Orujev (the vessel that carried oil workers to the legendary Oil Stones - Author)… The mission was accomplished… At 7.05 a.m. a ship of Neftegazflot approached from the sea… The commander of the regiment made an instantaneous decision, and four BMD-1 crawled out to the moorings, each sending two hollow-charge grenades onto the ship; the vessel caught fire."

Primakov and those of his ilk say that servicemen were killed in Baku. It could possibly be the case. However, they were killed, if they were, not by "militants" but as a result of chaos, unrestrained debauchery and different internal showdowns. The Chechen war showed that it was the plague of the Soviet and Russian army.

Alexey Vasilyev cites numerous slippery incidents.

"A burst of submachine-gun fire from our entrance. 'Don't move!' Oh, it's Corporal Radin training.

'But there's someone on the roof, he was aiming at me,' the fighter makes excuses…

'Look! Don't shoot without command or attack! Save cartridges!'

The house of the generals was next door from us; it was guarded by a special army group. Colleagues. I had approached them before and explained that we were near, that their flank was alright, that it was not desirable that they shoot in our direction.

Was it useful? Try to guess. The fence around the house was of stone, a path with a garden gate leading to the neighbours, we are behind the gate…

'Don't move!'

We do not. Bursts of submachine-gun fire follow, right at us! Who trained them? Naturally, I fall at once, press my nose against concrete and move backwards like a crayfish to the fence.

I can see the shooters clearly, three UAZ and a group of people against the sky. I could finish them with one burst. But these are our guys. So I crawl back, cursing to myself. Almost there… and then curses and screams, a Ryazan fellow is wounded. I have to crawl towards him. There is ringing in my ears. When will they run out of cartridges?

Finally, they did… blasted shooters… They heard me yell, stopped shooting. I should have given them a good dressing-down right then, but the wounded…

In word, I dragged him to our place, had his wounds dressed. I sent for Ryazan guys. I say, here he is, take the victim… By the way, that victim was given an order in a week, right in the hospital. As for me… I have received a medal recently, though… One of my lads plucked a bullet out of the fence in the morning. A souvenir. But there is ringing in the ear. I went to have a look; there was a trace where a bullet had ricocheted on the concrete, five centimetres from the spot where my head had been. Er… It is fair to say that it was not guys from the special unit that were shooting, just an antiaircraft defence colonel, the aide of the antiaircraft defence commander, scared devil…

Ural rushes into the neighbouring yard. Fighters land nicely and extend. The commander squats behind the vehicle and guides his people. Skilful! Napoleon, hell's bells! What does it remind me? Exactly! The storm of my house by the first company of our detachment. Amusing…

Radio station returned to life. So, Corporal Blokhin is on.

'They're shooting at us! What are we to do?'

Censored… I put that "counter" by the fence, and now the poor devils are lying under the "friendly fire". Scared, it is clear, too young… Well, frankly speaking, I am scared myself. Wife and child are at home, I am here… It is all hot air, though. Time to check phones. Pick up the receiver at random. 'It's Rubin, hello?'... Nice voice, the girl is in Moscow, and we are here… 'Sorry, Rubin, mistake'…

Ffffuck! A burst of fire from the hotel window at the position of the first company. Nothing in response. We burst into the hotel? What the hell? Who?

We drag a drunken infantry captain from the room on the second floor. Some people should drink less! No "ghosts" everywhere then.

A burst of submachine-gun fire returned me to the stern reality. In the hall, by the door, a Ryazan lieutenant showers the Persian carpet with burning cartridge cases… Where? At whom?

A message came that "guerillas" had got under fire, taken for militants. Ryazan guys "distinguished themselves"…

Certainly, in such half-drunken situation, when the army was crammed with common riffraff, there could be losses among the military. It is beyond doubt that they killed one another but Alexey Vasilyev passes this over in silence. And it is clear why!

This assumption was fully confirmed in Chechnya when hundreds of federal soldiers died at the hands of their fellow federal soldiers and blatant facts were revealed during trials!

A certain Alexey, far from sympathizing with Azerbaijan, says in the Internet, "In the infamous "Azeristan" (?! The country that reared you - Author), I lived till the withdrawal of the 4th army from there, i.e. through June 1992. I have seen Karabakh from the beginning, from February 1988. My father served in the 4th army department till retirement on pension, then worked as a technician in the KGB Department of the Azerbaijan SSR. We lived next to the military unit in Salyan barracks, OUR OWN GUYS FIRED UPON OUR HOUSE IN JANUARY 1990 (highlighted by the author. As the text indicates further, it is the invading troops that he regards as "their own guys")." Meanwhile, at that time the Soviet mass media were lying in every way that it was militants that had been firing upon the houses of the servicemen's families near Salyan barracks!

After the Soviet troops finished firing upon the flats of their comrades-in-arms, they raised a red flag above Salyan barracks that dangled there for about half a year.

When they did not shoot at civilians, the Soviet servicemen acted in Baku like looters and robbers. The following lines belong to the very eyewitness of the events, "gourmet" Alexey Vasilyev.

"Baku. A beautiful southern city. The city of bazaars, kebab and black caviar… (civilized people see much more sides of Baku - Author).

Ryazan guys sent a parliamentarian, they call us to come and see them. Paratroopers are accommodated in the hotel next to us. Commanders are sitting in the hall, a soldier in bullet-proof vest and helmet with a towel over his arm carry around pastry from the bar. A vivid picture…


'Yes, Comrade Senior Lieutenant!'

'Where have you found coffee?'

'Well… there was some…'

'Get it here! Get everything here!'

A nice life… Arabica in clay cups… A Bulgarian cigarette… Isn't it bliss? They've got a point, indeed. Why choke down packed meal if there are such reserves here…

Evening. In "storerooms", we found vodka, Zolotoye koltso. Confiscation…

A message came, somewhere servicemen robbed a provision store. It's bad, indeed, but people must eat, after all!"

"Nevertheless," specifies Vitaly Tokarev, the deputy commander in charge of policy of the special radio communication squad that was a part of Kirovograd brigade in Baku, "there were problems in relationship between servicemen and the local population. They often refused to serve us in shops alleging that they did not understand Russian, even if we wore civilian clothing." Another impression of the former political supervisor during his stay in the Caucasian republic was the abundance on the shelves of local shops. "I saw poverty reigning in Russia, where there was nothing on the shelves but kefir, bread, dried crust and sea girdle. But here I thought I was brought; several sorts of meat, sausage… Besides, I was very happy with the assortment of books in Russian, I remember that I brought home almost fifty books, The White Guard, Heavy Sand… One could only dream about such books here… I think, though, that the reason of such disparity in living standard between Soviet republics was policy of the then Soviet leadership. If the ethnic conflict in the Caucasus had been aggravated with insufficient provisions, the mass disorders would have probably taken a larger scale," writes Oksana Gutsalyuk.

Shopping, so to say!

Lebed recalls, "…Among other objects of the sea port, a restaurant was taken (?! - Author), and there was breakfast for about two hundred persons. Moreover, not just common breakfast, but kebab, balyk, black and red caviar. And there were soldiers who had lived on packed meal for a week. Agitated with the battle (if he has to lie, he lies with a bang! - Author), young, healthy and hungry which is quite normal for that age. Regarding, not without reason, the breakfast as a war trophy, they finished it off clean leaving only napkins.

..Elderly, dignified, thrifty and wise commanders of administrative platoons and battalions did not fail to take advantage of the situation to fill up the exhausted reserves for free." These are words of a Soviet general!

This is Lebed's another lie. No one made such parties in Baku in those terrible days. According to the director of the restaurant, Lebed rushed into his office and ordered, "Put everything you have on the table, otherwise I'm blowing the restaurant up!"

It was Lebed's favourite trick in Baku. When an ordinary electric wiring accident occurred, Lebed burst into the office of the first secretary of Nasimi district A. Jalilov with a gun in his hand and demanded that electricity be immediately switched on in Armenian flats, threatening to blow up the transformer vault.

It should be said that Jalilov acted with dignity in this situation. He said to Lebed, "Leave my office, set yourself to rights and then we will talk!"

One of the heads of the KGB top secret unit "Alfa" M. Boltunov, "The fighters did not complain about the lack of conveniences but when they were accommodated in barracks in Baku and given nothing but mattresses, even hard-boiled operatives were amazed. They lived in such conditions for three months, on dry rations. By the way, they were paid the very same 3,50 per day as travel allowance, while the job was such that they returned to the barracks at night, after midnight, towards morning, hardly the time for canteen."

M. Boltunov keeps back the most important thing. "Returning to the barracks at night, after midnight, towards morning", they sorted out their problems, each in his own way. The words of King Cain come to our mind at this. When Cain suggested that he bring mercenaries in the neighbouring state, the head of that state protested, "How can I feed this entire horde?" Cain answered, "You just allow them in, and they will subsist by themselves and solve all their problems."

When the film director Stanislav Govorukhin heard about the events in Baku he went there immediately together with a cameraman. He says, "Lying in front of me is the accidents log of a militia station. I turn over the pages: soldiers stopped a passer-by, searched him, took away his money; soldiers in a tank drove into the shop, broke through, committed a theft; soldiers took a cap from a passer-by; soldiers broke into a flat, searched for valuables, did not find anything and took the wedding ring off the lady owner's hand…"

It is relevant here to remember that pillage and theft was not something new for the Red and then Soviet Army. Both officers and privates succeeded in those during the Civil War and the Great Patriotic War. With rare exception, this phenomenon was not observed in the tsarist army, since officer's honour was valued there. A totally different spirit reigned among the Reds, suffice it to remember Babel's Horse Army.

Illegal searches were carried out in civilian houses under the pretence of searching for weapons. Such searches became general. "Collecting operation information, we used the form of sudden night raids," recalls Vitaly Tokarev, the the deputy commander in charge of policy of the special radio communication squad that was a part of Kirovograd brigade in Baku. "We searched car parks, garages, checked cars in fleets of taxis early in the morning… Sometimes we had to go too far, to withdraw weapons from basic military training classes, paramilitary guard, confiscate flare pots on cutters and ships…" writes Oksana Gutsalyuk.

After many years, a number of representatives of this riffraff continue to get dividends from Baku events, each in the way he can.

There are even such deranged servicemen who glorify their "feats" in Baku on 20 January, 1990 in poems and songs, and naturally not for free.

"Ten years ago, Captain Yurin spent this very day, 13 January, in Baku… Together with other soldiers Igor prayed to God for Yazov to give the order to set out. The songs written under the impression of those days are performed by Igor very rarely. Just in the circle of close friends. "I believe that we form exactly such a circle now," said the singer at his concert in Samara.

However, as a man that experienced the ordeals of service in a "flash point", Igor did not put emphasis upon military subject in his songs.

Sniper, Bright Stars of Baku, Notes from Squad 13 and Creeping in the Field are the only songs devoted to war performed by Igor at the concert." What a bastard a man should be to praise death of peaceful citizens!

Igor Yurin is not alone. Olga Yegorova writes in her essay Poems and Songs of the Sniper Denisov, "Colonel of special mission unit Vasily Nikolaevich Denisov, in the antiterrorist group Alfa since 1980, sniper, writes poems and songs about the events in Afghanistan and Baku in January 1990. Vasily is quite satisfied with his record album issued in 1997. Next year is the 25th anniversary of his unit and he plans to issue a magnetic album devoted solely to the group and the events they have taken part in, Afghanistan, Baku, Ordzhonikidze…"

It is well known that killing another victim, snipers make a notch on the buttstock. We wonder if the notches the sniper Denisov made in Baku on 20 January, 1990 will be described in his poems.

In January 1990, after the invasion of the Soviet troops in Baku, the battalion of the Soviet troops under the command of Vadim Orlov was redeployed from Ganja to Jalilabad. Vadim Orlov declared to the citizens of Jalilabad that he had been elected… the chairman of the town executive committee (at least it is what he said to the correspondent) and ran the show in the town for two months.

The activities of Soviet servicemen in Ganja and Jalilabad are well known in Azerbaijan, whereas the eight years of service in Azerbaijan was beneficial for Vadim Orlov himself.

Here is an excerpt from Delovoye Obozreniye.

Orlov Vadim Ivanovich, born in 1953 in Nizhneturinsk, Irkutsk region, to the family of a professional soldier. Graduated from Kiev Combined Arms School, Frunze Moscow Combined Arms Administration Academy. Was in command of a regiment, the chief of staff of a division in Kaunas, from 1993 to 1998 commander of 104th airborne brigade. In 2001 graduated from General Staff Academy. Elected in the House of Assembly of Ulyanovsk region in 1996. A member of State Duma of the Russian Federation since 1999. Chairman of the People's Party of Russia regional department. Awards: For Services before Motherland Fourth Class, Red Star, Daniil of Moscow for the construction of the Prophet Elijah temple.

We wonder what he has done in Azerbaijan to receive so many awards in the new Russia.

And finally, the most curious thing. Correspondent Tatyana Zadorozhnaya asks Vadim Orlov, "What clothes is more comfortable to you, a general's uniform or a business suit? Who takes care of your wardrobe?"

"I put on military uniform when very grave issues are on the agenda. I am not retired from the Armed Forces, I am in Putin's reserve. I like uniform, I am proud of it but a civil suit still becomes a deputy. Once I helped two Armenians, excellent tailors, leave Azerbaijan; they opened their own tailor's shop and make clothes fit for my nonstandard figure."

In this connection, Ils etaient cinq, a French film of the fifties, comes to our mind. At the end of the war a Petainist sets free several de Gaullists and tells them, "Don't forget about me in the new France!" The Armenians did not forget about Mr. Orlov in the new Russia! One should think that they provide not only clothes for him!

There were such thugs among the servicemen of the Soviet Army that should be tried for ethnic crimes by International Court of Justice in the Hague.

The chauvinist M. Polikarpov writes in his Sacrifice, "So, on 15 July, the group of four volunteers headed by Pretzel was redeployed… near Olovo to replace the Russian group located there. We were leaving for fifteen days. Generally speaking, our group was to consist of five persons but the "magician" disappeared quickly. So did his name. Besides Prentzel, Troll and I, there was Denis, a painter, about twenty-three years old. He had arrived in Bosnia several days before me. Denis had already had combat experience restoring order in Baku in January 1990 with the intelligence company of an airborne unit. HE HAS HIS OWN BONE TO PICK WITH THE MUSLIMS (highlighted by the author)."

The resolution of the commission says that several victims of 20 January were finished with bayonets. It is no doubt that the thug Denis was among those who finished peaceful citizens with bayonets.

And there were a lot of such scum as Denis!

Natalya Mozgovaya writes, "Who are you?" asks a spectacled soldier guarding the entrance to Homesh (Israel - Author). The figure of a moustached bloke in a black gangster bandana rose in front of him out of the dark.

The picture is full with a leather sleeveless jacket exposing strong tattooed forearms and fingerless gloves. "Help from Nagorno-Karabakh," the former commander of a special mission company Sergey Kulikov straightens M-16 on his shoulder."

This is followed by the idle talk that it is only strength that the Arabs understand.

We can imagine what this thug had been doing in Nagorno-Karabakh!

The Soviet troops had no restraint in Baku, meanwhile the armament of the Soviet Army was being seized in Armenia in volume. As one would expect, after the crime of Moscow, the GPU of the Soviet Army and the Soviet mass media entered that bloody game.

Here is one of the scenes arranged by the GPU of the Soviet Army immediately after the introduction of troops in Baku; the author witnessed it.

In one of Baku streets, engines of BMP are growling powerfully, bursts of submachine-gun fire are heard somewhere, some people are letting out heartrending cries.

The communications officer of the Soviet Army Colonel General K. Kobets (a big thief, as it was found out later, he was convicted in the new Russia) surrounded by some people with microphones is standing on the armour of a BMP shouting something. Against the background of that noise and roar, correspondents are asking him something, he is answering. An impressive picture! The author approached one intelligent-looking (and he proved to be such) officer and asked, "What is going on?" "Can't you see?" he grinned. "A reportage on street fights!" and he went aside. Military tension was imitated at every turn in Baku; any everyday conflict with patrol was regarded as an attempt of armed attack. Patrols usually strolled about the city with a soldier who had a radio transmitter; as soon as any problem emerged with citizens, an alarm was sent over the radio, "To Cloud - Thunderstorm!" and several minutes later a group of soldiers would appear who began shooting into the air at once.

These - even hard to choose a definition for them - people even had no mercy upon the memory of the killed civilians; they used to put a submachine-gun beside the bodies and took photos, passing them for militants in such a disgusting way.

The GPU of the Soviet Army knew its stuff! After the introduction of troops all Soviet mass media were involved in the political provocation, and the Central Television, newspapers Izvestiya, Pravda and Krasnaya Zvezda distinguished themselves in the general chorus. One had an impression that they were issued by Goebbels's office, judging by the scale of the lies in their reports. Authors began to appear in those newspapers that had never been published there before. The editor-in-chief of Izvestiya, a repeated deputy of the USSR Supreme Council from Azerbaijan Laptev and, as became clear later, one of Gorbachev's lackeys, turned the paper into a provocative "front leaflet" from Baku. Even a front correspondent appeared, clearly from secret services, a certain Igor Andreyev who did his best to conceal the truth about the events in Baku.

The republican-famous criminalist Rovshan Aliyev exposed the Goebbels-like trick used by ideologists of the Soviet Army. Two issues of Krasnaya Zvezda were published, with one and the same number and date, to hide the crimes, one for the USSR and another for Azerbaijan with the description of the events in Baku.

Baku considered it as a common provocation but it was not so at all. This was a well-thought strategy.

In the late eighties, Krasnaya Zveda was the chief source of military and political information for the Americans, with 75% references being made to that newspaper. By comparison, only 16% were made to the main USSR newspaper, Pravda. Moscow was well aware of these figures.

On 20 January, 1990, TASS announced, "As was reported before, as a result of unlawful acts of the extremist forces of the People's Front, anti-Soviet groups that had tried to suspend the constitutional bodies of the Azerbaijan SSR from power, the situation in Baku became aggravated..."

On 22 January, 1990, Pravda wrote such filthy lines, "The allegations of the People's Front leaders that there were victims among women and children as a result of the measures on state of emergency are of explicitly provocative nature. We should repeat once again that it is an ill-intentioned lie! Its aim is to prejudice the population against the Soviet Army and law enforcement bodies."

The powerful misinformation did its part; a Londoner interviewed in the street said on BBC, "No sooner had they begun building a normal state than this misfortune came. Gorbachev had no choice." This misinformed Englishman actually condemned those crushed by the Soviet tanks!

When the final figures on the victims among the civil population during the introduction of troops in Baku became definite, the director general of TASS Leonid Petrovich Kravchenko did his best to conceal those figures from the West.

Concerning the events of 20 January, 1990 in Baku in his original programme Namedni, video tapes of which spread afterwards all over Europe, L. Parfenov said that "the crowd in the square kept shooting back…" (?! - Author), "there is a guerilla war in Baku" (?! - Author), "terrorists brow up the television centre in Baku." Perhaps he was right in the last statement, since it was proved that the power unit of the television centre had been blown up by a special group from the KGB.

The author remembers well how much hope for a better future after the tragedy of 20 January, 1990 was in the reaction of Baku to Seven Days programme which told the truth about the events in Baku in those terrible days. But the programme suddenly disappeared from broadcasting, so a remarkable television journalist, the mighty Tikhomirov. The reason became clear many years later. As could be expected, it was Gorbachev's doing.

Oleg Dobrodeyev, the director of the All-Russian State Television and Radio Company, answers the questions of Tatyana Malkina, "Naturally, I have been in that up till now. Speaking of driving levers that the state can use, I cannot compare the current situation even to Gorbachev's period which is commonly called the most liberal one today. I will never forget them closing Seven Days, where I was director and editor-in-chief, after my business trip in Baku in January 1990. It was closed exactly after that and after the materials we had brought from there."

Instead of assisting foreign journalists to come in Azerbaijan and to tell and show the whole world the atrocities of the Soviet troops, the head of the Azerbaijan KGB V. Huseynov arranged a full-scale chase for foreign journalists to please Moscow. The only welcome guests were the official central press media and television that were lying in unison on the Central Television and in the central newspapers. The materials of those who tried to write the truth, like Rozhnov, were not published. On 20 January of this year French correspondents Daniel-Claude Jeanen, Dominique Dudouble, Stefan Bantura, Michel Peinard were detained by the State Security Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR in Nakhchivan for the violation of rules of entry and movement in the frontier zone.

Photojournalists of Sigma and Gamma Alain Noges and Vlastimir Nesic and employees of BBC radiocorporation Benjamin Brown and Rory Peck were also detained.

Officers of the Azerbaijan KGB smashed all equipment of the Estonian correspondent A. Ruassar and took away all photos.

After Suleymenov's departure, his assistant Almast Yesikov was to continue to collect documents and evidence of eyewitnesses which Suleymenov needed. Immediately after Suleymenov's departure, on 31 January, 1990 Yestikov was arrested by the 4th department of the KGB and sent to the pre-trial prison N3 in Mardakan settlement. He was arrested in Apsheron hotel where he stayed. All his documents, camera, film footage, personal belongings were confiscated. Poorly thought-out as it might be, democratization of all authority bodies was going on throughout the country, whereas the leadership of the Azerbaijan B acted like in the fifties or sixties.

After the well-known events pro-fascist elements such as Andrey Nuykin, Leonid Gozman, who had been waiting for the chance for along time, appeared on the stage. Gozman said, "We are guilty of having been guided by primitive instincts when choosing side in the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict. We ignored the fact that the other side is different people. My position is pro-Armenian, I apologize to the Azerbaijani, but I cannot but agree that Azerbaijan is a whole dark power." There are different people in any nation, including that represented by Gozman. The author for one cannot agree either that Leonid Gozman is a bugger unless Gozman declares that himself. Over 30 anti-Azerbaijan articles were written by the journalist Andrey Pralnikov concerning the events in the region and his impartiality is lamentable indeed. But here is what he writes in Moscow News 4.02.1990 in his article Lull in Karabakh, "The limit of cynicism is the fact that both the killed pogrom-makers and accidental victims of street skirmish and chaotic shooting on 20th and the following days are buried side by side in the so-called Alley of Shekhids." Such lines insulting the cherished and sacred memory of SHEKHIDS could be written only by such a complete scoundrel as Andrey Pralnikov from Moscow News whose editor, Loshak, was also a scoundrel!

D. Mishin and A. Lisitsina start up a selection of materials filled with various dirt words against the Azerbaijan people in article We Are in Karabakh for So Many Day. It is instantly published by the mass-media of Armenia, but it is so mean that any other newspaper publishes it, except Leningrad Smena, on 22 March, 1991. Appearance of such fascists and geeks as Leonid Gozman, Andrey Pralnikov and the like (there were plenty of them) was not accidental. In the Soviet time they used to weight their actions with the party line and expressed their views only in their kitchens in a low voice, hating it and at the same time feeling animal fear. In Gorbachev's time of lawlessness they immediately used their stinking talent in the situation when nothing threatened them already. Azerbaijan was in a difficult situation and had no time to beat off blows from different directions. And nuykins, gozmans, pralnikovs and the like made use of it.

And as often happens in such cases, as the further events shown, these people do not represent anyone except for themselves. No sooner had Y. Kiselev appeared in Moscow News and given Loshak a little asy kick in the butt than the latter instantly disappeared from the editorial staff with nobody defending him.

Concerning the activity of these gentlemen, it is a pity that there was no one in Baku to outbid those bastards, since they cost very cheap at that time, even cheaper than prostitutes!

Leningrad documentary film makers changed their ways as well; in the Soviet time they used to shoot films about the revolution, Lenin's places and Leningrad blockade. After changing their ways, they made a documentary about Karabakh events A Merry Trip of Real Men where they tell with explicit sympathy about the bloody deeds of Karabakh separatists. A film about Karabakh events was also made by the Latvian film director Pondnieks, within the same trend but with Baltic reserve. Nevzorov's documentary on the events does not make it clear who is to blame; so it seems that some set the USSR on fire and others are bad at putting it out! One famous documentary film maker said once, "A good man will never make a documentary film director." Generalization is always inconsistent but the Karabakh selection confirms that statement! We should only add that A Merry Trip of Real Men deserves the Hague Tribunal.

Regrettable enough, we should also sat that Vezirov's team was not particularly concerned about the anti-Azerbaijan articles in the Soviet mass media, as they were all more concerned about another issue, publishing anti-Aliyev articles in the Soviet mass media.

The start was given by the filthy slanderous article by Alkady Vaxberg in Literaturnaya Gazeta "responses" to which came and were all immediately. Many years later it was found out that it was an action paid from Baku.

A provocative article by H. Aliyev's fellow countryman V. Efendiyev appears in Pravda, Aliyevism, or Lamentation over Sweet Times. After the publication of this article H. Aliyev receives the following letter, "Dear Heydar Aliyevich! The article Aliyevism, or Lamentation over Sweet Time published in Pravda and signed with my name is a provocation and rude fabrication I have never signed…" Naturally, Pravda never published a disclaimer. It appears in the distant Washington Post.

The organizer of that article, one H. Aliyev's favourites in the recent past, was well-known then, which he did not hide, though.

In his tale novels that appeared in that period, Neznamsky relates the negative phenomena of the Soviet time to Aliyev.

Before the introduction of troops in Baku, Gorbachev made a provocative phone call to Aliyev. H. Aliyev recalls, "On 19 January, the day before the tragedy, Gorbachev called me all of a sudden. It was our first conversation after 1987 and it passed on a higher pitch. Gorbachev said that there were disorders in Azerbaijan and that I was to blame for them. He said that I am to blame for the fact that the Soviet power had actually been overthrown in the republic and therefore I should have taken urgent measures to influence the events. He threatened that if I had not done it they would have kept me in check. And they would set things right in Azerbaijan any way… On 21 January after the meeting in the permanent mission I tried to contact Gorbachev. They did not connect me. Then I said say to Kryuchkov, Ligachev, Yakovlev and Razumovsky. They all said that I was committing a crime. I answer it is you that are criminals. Time will come and you will answer for everything… In general, it is no wonder that they all were against my return to Azerbaijan."

The call was nothing else but an attempt to involve Aliyev in the dirty anti-Azerbaijan business.

H. Aliyev's manly response to Gorbachev's provocation followed without delay.

On the day following the introduction of the Soviet troops in Baku, taking a great risk, Aliyev resolutely condemned the introduction of troops at the press conference in the Azerbaijan permanent mission and accused Gorbachev in the violation of the Constitution. On 9 February Aliyev had a meeting with the journalist Andrey Karaulov and a Washington Post Moscow correspondent David Remnik and gave them a detailed interview in which he repeated his accusations against Gorbachev.

Washington Post Moscow correspondent David Remnik writes concerning that press conference, "In the late January, when Aliyev was on holiday in Barvikha, he heard of the tragedy in Baku. At the press conference in the Azerbaijan permanent mission in Moscow Aliyev criticized Kremlin sharply for the use of the armed forces in Baku. Excerpts from Aliyev's speech were published in the West and, more importantly, returned to the Soviet audience through short-wave radio. "It was the first time in my life that I spoke in protest against the establishment publicly," said Aliyev who began his career as an operative agent of the KGB and officer and whose courage is comparable to that of the late Andrey Sakharov." The comparison to Sakharov is not proper, since he has never been threatened by anything, with the West defending him with might and main.

V. Huseynov says concerning the events of 20 January, "In October 1989 I met with the People's Front leaders, the future president of Azerbaijan Abulfaz Elchibey and Etibar Mamedov. I asked them then, "Why don't you want to follow the pattern of the people's fronts of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia? I can seek election to the Supreme Council within the frames of the Constitution and existing laws, too." They alleged that every country had its own peculiarities. "And generally speaking, one cannot gain independence without shedding blood. Yes, we do know there will be victims! But those will be victims in the name of freedom!"

"Do you assume responsibility for the future victims? Are you leading the people to bloodshed consciously?" I exclaimed. "Yes, we believe that the more blood is shed the stronger is the unity of courage and ideology of the nation," was their reply.

In the period from 23 to 26 January, 1990 (we do not remember the precise date), the author together with R. Guliyev secretly came in the flat of B. Allakhverdiyev in Yasamal where Elchibey was hiding. They first thing Elchibey said (we remember it clearly) was, "How could that happen? Was the Soviet Empire capable of that?" Elchibey did not say any tumid words like those V. Huseynov mentions; it was a profoundly shocked man. Another thing should be pointed out here. The future conversation made it clear that the People's Front leader had failed to forecast the further events in the republic, there was a total discrepancy in opinions.

In this connection we recall another incident related to Elchibey. One day after the January events, R. Guliyev came to the author's well into the night and, well aware of the latter's friendly relations, said that it was necessary to find the public prosecutor general I. Ismaylov urgently, as Elchibey might be arrested in the morning.

Ismayklov was awaken and said that he was aware of those intentions but neither he nor the public prosecutor of Baku would authorize Elchibey's arrest.

And we recall with a sore heart R. Guliyev, the speaker of the parliament already, said to Elchibey publicly, "You wretched, even your relatives did not vote for you at the presidential election!"

There can be no life-time friends in politics, indeed, but only life-time interests which change, too, though!"

Olzhas Suleymenov writes, "I fell in love with Azerbaijan long ago. I saw this country in the seventies, in the early eighties, it was flourishing and poetically excited. Anniversaries of Nizami, Fizuli, Days of Soviet Literature… All those trips took place in summer and therefore the image of that land is rich green, flowers, fountains, pomegranate champagne, tanned friendly faces. I saw winter in Baku only once. In the black January of 1990. Motor-cars crushed by tanks together with people…"

Azerbaijan will always remember that Olzhas Suleymenov arrived in Baku on 22 January, 1990, sick, with a fever, to show moral support which Baku needed most.

Azerbaijan should always remember that one of the few who raised their voice in defence of Azerbaijan in the winter 1990 was Yulian Semenov.

In 1998 Ochag newspaper was published in Tallinn which had a certain part to play in the truthful estimate of the events in Azerbaijan. When the Azerbaijani arranged a march in Tallinn in protest against the introduction of troops in Baku on 20 January, 1990 and the authorities tried to break it up, the incumbent President of Estonia Arnold Ruytel rose to defend the Azerbaijani.

It should be necessarily mentioned that there were officers both in the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Azerbaijan who opposed the occupation forces without fear of being brought to responsibility by the military prosecutor's office.

One of the officers told the USSR minister of internal affairs Lieutenant General Vadim Bakatin at the protest march of the Ministry of Internal Affairs employees, "As the senior investigator, I will arrest you since you shed the blood of my people."

The famous composer, deputy of the USSR Supreme Council Arif Melikov showed operational efficiency and courage in the January events.

We recall him entering a discussion with Gorbachev while most of other deputies preferred to keep silent. He passed the materials on the January events by the phone from Baku to Baltimore Sun (the USA), El Pais (Spain) and a number of other publications, and also to the English radio on 26 January, 1990.

According to eyewitnesses, People's Artist of the USSR Rashid Beybutov also entered a tough discussion with Gorbachev shortly before the January events, as if anticipating the disaster.

A. Gajiyeva writes, "The events were already unfolding in Baku, tanks were standing by the theatre. On 1 December, 1988 Gorbachev gathered members of parliamentary commissions of Azerbaijan and Armenia, deputies to discuss Karabakh issue. At that meeting Rashid Beybutov said to Gorbachev, "I have to go through a chain of tanks to get into my theatre." Gorbachev answered, "But these are our tanks!" Rashid says, "These are not our tanks, these are your tanks! Karabakh issue must be solved now and immediately, otherwise blood will be shed!" Rashid was telling later, "My mind was kind of jammed at that moment. I repeated several times on end, "Otherwise blood will be shed!" As if someone was making me say these words…" When he came back to Baku he was very sad and said once, "They will put me out of their way."

Rashid Beybutov loved Karabakh ardently. "They call me everywhere a merry boy from Karabakh," it was one of his favourite songs!

It is not accidental that those who were in power then and devotedly looked into the eyes of Gorbachev and Vezirov keeping silence about their deeds continue to use their position in power even today to take revenge upon Beybutov's family.

In January 1991, in the year of the bloody events, the writer Anar characterized Gorbachev as follows, "During my meetings with Gorbachev I found him a versatile, clever and ingenious politician. He is undoubtedly not a cruel person by nature. But he so to say knows on which side his bread is buttered and it is not easy to guess his true intentions… I say again, not being a cruel person, to my opinion, he sometimes justifies if not authorizes rather brutal and bloody actions (Tbilisi, Baku, Lithuania). President needs the army now more than ever and I think he can justify any of its actions, even such ones he would not approve as a man and not as a politician. Naturally, human life is not a trifle for him but at the same time it all is not an inappropriate price for him as a politician to achieve some aim." In our time of pluralism of opinion, such opinion has right to exist, too.

Azerbaijan documentary film makers headed by R. Fataliyev accomplished, we dare to say, a real feat those days when they risked their lives to film the bloody events of 20 January, 1990.

The author has seen many video tapes made by them.

A courageous deed was made by the Chairman of the Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Council E. Kafarova who brought a video tape of the bloody events in Baku in her bag to Moscow where it was demonstrated to representatives of the world mass media.

Doctors of Azerbaijan proved to be loyal to Hippocratic Oath; they risked their lives to save wounded civilians.

There have always been persons in Russia, too, who expressed their opinion that differed from that of the authorities.

The famous Moscow film director Stanislav Govorukhin wrote in his article A Rehearsal? in Moscow News, 18 February, 1990, "If the troops entered the city not to defend it, then why? Two millions of Baku citizens understood it as follows. The tanks entered the city to punish the people demanding sovereignty. And the punishment would be exemplary to teach the other republic not to try it. Well, in that case, the military expedition in Baku proved clearly that an empire can be held up with bayonets even today."

A fragment of the statement of independent experts of the public military organization "Shield" says, "To the Chief Military Prosecutor Katusev A.V. In the city of Baku on 19-25 January, 1990 a military crime was committed under the general guidance of the minister of defence Yazov. We ask You to institute criminal proceedings against the guilty ones."

"The USSR armed forces were used in Baku not with the purpose of defence against external aggression but against the people. The punitive operation is a prearranged slaughter of innocent people with application of means of warfare banned by the international law. The USSR minister of defence, who headed the operation and allowed the possibility of committing military crimes by the army personnel, thereby committed a military crime that falls within Clause 6 of the International Military Tribunal, as well as clauses of the Azerbaijan SSR Criminal Code concerning crimes against person (Section 3). Criminal cases are to be initiated against other persons from among the army staff that committed military crimes. Material damage inflicted on the citizens of Baku, its institutions and organizations is to be repaired by the USSR Ministry of Defence. They same sources are to pay indemnity and benefits to the families of the victims, medical treatment and rehabilitation of the wounded and disabled."

A. Yevstigneyev,
Captain 1st rank of reserve,
Candidate of Science;

G. Melkov,
Captain 2nd rank of reserve,
Candidate of Law;

B. Murasov,
Lieutenant Colonel of reserve

(Moscow News,
N32, 12 August, 1990)

After the bloody introduction of troops in Baku, the "grounding" of that act appeared. This is how Gorbachev "grounds" the introduction of troops in Baku, "Attacks on military servicemen, weapons depots, law enforcement bodies became more frequent. These events took a particularly dramatic form in Baku, pogroms, murders, banishment of innocent people from their homes and the republic.

The activity of extremist forces in Azerbaijan was becoming more and more antistate, anticonstitutional and antinational.

Lawful authority bodies were forcibly removed from office in a number of regions, administration structures were wrecked.

Engineering facilities were destroyed along hundreds of kilometers of the state border. The mission of a forcible assumption of power in the republic was actually no secret.

It could not go on. Alongside with profound compassion for the innocent victims, fury and indignation at the criminal actions, brutal violence and vandalism, violation of the law were rising in the country.

The Soviet people fairly demanded that the leadership of the country take resolute measures to restore law and order and ensure safety of people's lives.

As you already know, by the resolution of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council state of emergency was declared in Baku and the units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Soviet Army entered the city.

They captured key objects, took state institutions under control, resolute measures are being taken against the pogrom-makers, organizers and instigators of the disorders. Fire arms and ammunition are confiscated from criminals.

To my deep regret, there are victims. Military units were met with fire by the terrorists in some places and had to use weapons in response.

Disaster came into someone's house today. I present my sincere condolences to those families.

…The duty of the state is to put a stop to the lawlessness and inhumanity, to suppress firmly the criminal actions of the extremists who lost human face and are ready to make sacrifice for the sake of their personal ambitions, vested interests and striving after power.

The duty of the state is to return peace and safety to the people, to give the peoples of both republics the opportunity to develop freely and democratically, work and live safely, raise children.

The soldiers and officers of the Soviet Army and internal troops perform their duty defending the USSR Constitution and Law (several years later the same "duty" in relation to civilians will be performed by the Russian troops in Chechnya. - Author).

The leadership hopes that the measures taken will be understood and supported by all peoples of our country."

Does he not remind you Goebbels who grounded the attack on another country in the same way, perverting all facts? The Chancellor of Germany Helmut Kohl had his reasons to compare Gorbachev to Goebbels in his interview to Newsweek and argued his comparison quite clearly. Gorbachev raised no public diplomatic scandal and "swallowed" it quietly.

"People lie freely with their mouths but the grimaces they make at it still tell the truth," Nietzsche wrote. But it was about people, not Gorbachev. Speaking on the Central Television about the events of 20 January, 1990 in Baku, he lied both with his mouth and face.

This man lies both about important and small things!

In his appearance on NTV on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of Victory, he tells his liveliest recollection of those years, "I worked since the age of thirteen. We ploughed on cows. I will never forget the sight, the cows were crying!" And here he lies again, not about cows which were probably crying, indeed, most likely because of some ocular disease, but about the liveliest recollection of the war year!

V. Boldim writes, "Mikhail Sergeyevich often recollected the difficult war years but did not much like to tell that the occupants that had stayed in their home made them cook for them and Mikhail had had to pluck geese and chicken for Hitlerites' table for hours. Gorbachev did not tell about the atrocities of the fascists but the moment when a Kalmuck that had been cooperating with the Germans had beaten him with a whip became etched in his memory. He often recalled that unfriendly act towards the future president of the USSR." Gorbachev's liveliest recollection was those years was that whip and not cows, since a lash is a much more down-to-earth that cows' tears!

Gorbachev used to say that he did not serve in the Soviet Army and lied again! "He was the director of provision store," his namesake Galkin tells. "Exactly, I am not confusing anything. It is impossible to confuse… Probably this is why his military service has always been hushed. He was ashamed. For he (Gorbachev - Author) did not perform exploits but was in charge of cereals, canned food and sausage," writes Moskovsky Komsomolets, 28 June, 2004.

S.I. Ozhegov's Dictionary of the Russian Language says, "Terror - physical violence up to physical destruction, towards political opponents."

Gorbachev acted like a true terrorist that did not retreat before blood of innocent people on 20 January, 1990 in Baku to hold political power, to preserve the USSR. He acted like a follower of Lenin and Hitler. "Terror is a means of conviction," Lenin said. "Terror is the most efficient political means," said Hitler.

According to the common confession of various political forces in Baku, the chief ideologist and performer of the January action in Baku was Yevgeny Primakov.

Primakov, another Gorbachev's closest associate at that time, writes in regard to the January events, "In connection with the events in Nagorno-Karabakh, the situation is Azerbaijan became sharply aggravated in summer 1989. On 16 July the foundation conference of the People's Front of Azerbaijan was held; the latter skillfully used the resentment among the people masses and was openly laying hands on power both in the capital and in the periphery, establishing its own bodies of administration…"

…after the election you have only one step to the separation. We cannot and will not allow that happen…"

Those were terrible days. Over a hundred Azerbaijanis, mainly militants, were killed at the introduction of troops, but there were also victims among the civilians when the troops fired back to the windows out of which bullets came. The army cased in armour lost 38 people, too."

The well-known expression is relevant here, "He lies like an eyewitness."

Here are the results of Gorbachev's barbaric introduction of the Soviet troops in Baku on 20 January, 1990.

Picture 4 gives the scheme of the invasion of the Soviet troops in Baku.

Here is an extract from the resolution of the Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Council commission on the investigation of circumstances and causes of the tragic events related to the introduction of the Soviet troops in Baku on 19-20 January, 1990.

"On the night of 20 January, on the basis of the resolution of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council signed by M.S. Gorbachev, introduction of troops was carried out and state of emergency was declared in the capital of Azerbaijan, Baku.

The resolution was passed in violation of the Constitution of the Azerbaijan SSR, Constitution of the USSR and international law standards.

The introduction of troops in Baku was accompanied by mass acts of violence on the part of the military, as a result of which hundreds of civilians were killed, wounded and illegally subjected to repression, heavy damage was inflicted on the state, public and personal property. In its brutality, this criminal act outstripped actions of the troops in Tbilisi (April, 1989), in Vilnius (January, 1991) and is one of shameful pages of the Soviet history, such as intrusion into Hungary in 1956, into Czechoslovakia in 1968.

Over 2,000 written statements, hundreds of spoken messages have been submitted to the commission. To verify them, over 2,500 persons have been interrogated, over 250 examinations of scenes of actions and objects, 286 ballistic, automatic technical, merchandising, engineering examinations have been carried out, 94 certificates on forensic medical examination of corpses and also the conclusion of military experts have been received, a considerable quantity of audio and video data has been collected.

2,517 inquiries have been made in various state, administrative and law bodies, as well as public organizations and military department of the USSR and the Azerbaijan SSR. The inquiries made in the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council and the CPSU Central Committee remained without response.

On the basis of the starting material, the commission prepared the statement on the preliminary results of its work approved on 11 February, 1990, at the meeting of the Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Council where the flagrant violation of Clause 119 Item 14 of the USSR Constitution on the part of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council expressed in the declaration of state of emergency in Baku without the consent of the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan was discussed; the issue was raised concerning personal responsibility of the persons that had authorized this unlawful resolution and performed the direct guidance of the introduction of troops in Baku allowing use of antihuman, brutal methods that had led to tragic consequences; the demand was voiced for the formation of a deputy commission of the USSR Supreme Council on the given event.

The commission established the following.

1. The situation in the republic on the eve of the events.

The main reason of the sharp aggravation of the social and political situation was the activization of Armenian nationalists in NKAO and Armenia with the purpose of separation of NKAO from the republic which violated the sovereignty of the Azerbaijan Republic and its territorial integrity. The highest bodies of the state power of the USSR and the republic, as the guarantee of the sovereignty of the Soviet republic, did not show firmness, resolution and consistence in performance of their constitutional responsibilities. It shattered confidence of the Azerbaijan people in the governing bodies and led in 1988 to the formation of a mass people movement to protect the territorial integrity of the republic and its sovereignty.

The purposeful anti-Azerbaijan activity of the Committee of Special Administration of NKAO headed A. Volsky furthered the radicalization of the people movement. The puppet leadership of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee represented by A. Vezirov and V. Polyanichko did not manage and did not wish to mobilize the population and all forces to defend national interests.

On 19 January the USSR Supreme Council adopted the disastrous resolution "On the declaration of state of emergency in Baku". The population was not notified of the planned use of troops and of the beginning of the regime in advance. State of emergency was put into operation almost immediately, at 12.00 a.m. on 20 January, 1990. At 7.27 p.m. on 19 January Azerbaijan television was already disabled. At 12.20 a.m. 9 citizens were killed by the military. The reservists and servicemen of Armenian nationality were particularly notable for their brutality. Only at 7.00 a.m. 20 January, after the barbaric intrusion into the city, killing all peaceful people that had come along, crushing transport vehicles, firing buildings, ambulances, the military authorities declared state of emergency on the radio.

2. The consequences of unlawful actions of the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the KGB of the USSR in Baku and other regions of Azerbaijan.

By the moment state of emergency was declared to the population 82 people had been killed and 20 fatally wounded (all deceased in hospitals) by the military. In the following days, 21 people were killed in Baku, 8 people were killed in Neftechala where no state of emergency had been declared and in Lenkoran. 131 people were killed in total in January 1990 as a result of the unlawful introduction of troops. Only 42 people of them were participants of pickets, 9 people were killed at the attempt to render medical aid to the wounded after the breach of blockade, 6 people were killed in motor-cars during transportation of the wounded to medical institutions (including ambulances), 17 were killed as a result of firing upon motor-cars and city transport in other parts of the city. Those people did not know about the state of emergency, went on their personal affairs. 7 citizens were killed in their houses and flats by bullets when the military fired upon dwelling houses on their way, 19 people were killed near their houses when they went out to learn what was going on in the city. Facts of death of 5 people have not been established.

82 of the examined 92 bodies had gunshot wounds, in 9 cases injuries inflicted by blunt objects, in 2 cases injuries inflicted by cut and thrust objects, in 1 case strangling with a loop.

By the positions of exit perforations in the body, it has been established that in 44 of 82 cases of gunshot wounds shots were made from behind. Wounds in the head - 29, in the body - 39, in the limbs - 4, in different areas of the body all at once - 10 cases. In all 9 cases of injuries inflicted by blunt objects it has been established that military vehicles rolled over the bodies with caterpillar tracks; one body was crushed into a mash, 2 people could not be identified.

Out of 131 killed: male - 124, female - 7. Males - 7 under ages; married ones left 159 orphans; workers - 78, employees - 24, students of colleges - 12, student of vocational schools - 2, schoolchildren - 4, pensioners - 3, temporarily unemployed - 6. By nationality: Azerbaijani - 117, Russian - 6, Jew - 3, Tartar - 7; 7 people were killed in the execution of official duty: 5 officers of bodies of internal affairs, 2 ambulance personnel. Specialists have established that bullet produced particularly damaging effect (MZV-13, displaced centre of gravity increasing its damaging effect).

In the regions of Azerbaijan 744 people were wounded. 460 of them underwent forensic medical examinations, among them 375 on the basis of the resolution of the investigating group of the USSR public prosecutor's office, the rest at the suit of the commission and the injured themselves. The most wounds are gunshot. 176 people, including 21 women, were registered as disabled as a result of the wounds.

The military destroyed and damaged about 200 houses and flats, 88 personal motor-cars, fire emerged in 5 flats and property was destroyed with incendiary bullets.

3. Conclusions and suggestions.

1. Responsible for the criminal actions of the Soviet troops in Azerbaijan are M. Gorbachev, Y. Pimakov, A. Ghirenko, D. Yazov, V. Kryuchkov, V. Bakatin, V. Varennikov and other high ranking officials of the political and military bodies of the former Soviet Union.

2. The internal reasons of the tragedy were the inability to realize the objective and irreversible nature of the national liberation processes and democratic changes in Azerbaijan, isolation from the mass people movement on the part of the leadership of the republic. The direct liability for this rests with A. Vezirov, V. Polyanichko. The moral responsibility rests with E. Kafarova, A. Mutalibov, I. Ismaylov, A. Mamedov, V. Huseynov. The opposition bears political and moral responsibility: N. Panakhov, E. Mamedov, R. Gaziyev and others. They were aware of the possibility of introduction of troops but took no appropriate warning measures to remove the people from the line of march of the troops.

Year of birth
Cause of death
Abbasova Farida Nariman gizi
Wound in the area of chest
Abdullayev Zakhid Abdulla oglu
Gunshot wound left side of the head
Agaverdiyev Aslan Aliakram oglu
Gunshot wound in the area of stomach
Agakishiyev Shakir Khandash oglu
Gunshot wound in the area of chest and stomach
Alimov Ramiz Kharisovich
Gunshot wound in the area of left side of chest
Allakhverdiyev Ruslan Kamil oglu
Gunshot wound in the area of chest
Babayev Fuad Yaver oglu
Gunshot wound in the neck
Babayev Isabala Ali oglu
Gunshot wound in the head
Bakhshiyev Elchin Mirza oglu
Gunshot wound in the area of chest and stomach
Bessantina Vera Lvovna
Gunshot wound in the area of stomach
Bogdanov Valery Zakirovich
Wound in the neck and chest
Buniat-zadeh Ulvi Yusif oglu
Gunshot wound in the head
Garayev Ilgar Alioglu
Gunshot wound in the area of the head
Gasimov Abbas Mamed oglu
Gunshot wound in the waist
Gasimov Yusif Ibrahim oglu
Gunshot wound in the head
Geybullayev Elchin Suyaddin oglu
Gunshot wound in the area of the left side of stomach
Guliyev Sakhavat Balay oglu
Gunshot wound in chest
Gojamanov Aliyusif Bilal oglu
Gunshot wound in the area of chest
Abulfazov Mirjalal Mirsalekh oglu
Traumatic shock, right side ribs and shoulder blade fracture
Azizov Khabil Kommuvar oglu
Numerous head and chest fractures (APC)
Alekperov Azer Nasib oglu
Blunt gunshot wound in the neck
Aleskerov Zaur Tasim oglu
Blunt gunshot wound in the head
Aliyev Bayram Madat oglu
Asphyxia, chest and stomach compression, ribs fractures
Alizadeh Faik Abdulhuseyn oglu
Perforating gunshot wound in the stomach
Akhmedov Ilgar Gumbat oglu
Gunshot wound and left eye aperture in the head
Zulalov Isfandiyar Aghil oglu
Gunshot wound in the area of right temple
Ibrahimov Ilgar Rashid oglu
Gunshot wound in the chest
Isayev Rauf Sultanmajid oglu
Gunshot wound in the forehead
Isayev Fakhraddim Khudu oglu
Gunshot wound in the area of chest
Ismaylov Tofik Babakhan oglu
Gunshot wound in the area of chest
Israilov Aganazar Araz oglu
Gunshot wound in the head
Yusubov Oleg Kerimovich
Gunshot wounds in the chest and stomach
Kazimov Aflatun Gashim oglu
Gunshot wounds in the chest and stomach
Kerimov Oktay Eyvaz oglu
Gunshot wound in the front of the stomach
Mamedova Larisa Farman gizi
Gunshot wound in the area of chest
Mamedov Vidadi Uzeyir oglu
Gunshot wound in the neck, grave blood loss
Mamedov Ibrahim Behbud oglu
Blunt trauma of hip bones and limbs
Mamedov Mamed Yarmamed oglu
Gunshot wounds in the head and body
Muradov Mehman Asad oglu
Perforating gunshot wound in the chest
Mustafayev Mahir Vaghif oglu
Gunshot wound in the left side of chest
Nasibov Allakhyar Iskender oglu
Blunt gunshot wound in the chest and left arm
Nasirov Yanver Shirali oglu
Blunt gunshot wound in the chest
Nischenko Andrey Alexandrovich
Stab and cut wound in the area of the front of the neck
Poladi Salekh Aligulu oglu
Gunshot wound in the head
Salmanov Sharafaddim Muzaffar oglu
Gunshot wound in the head
Mamedov Jabrayil Huseynkhan oglu
Gunshot wound in the chest
Gasanov Ali Khudaverdi oglu
Perforating gunshot wound in the head
Gasanov Mehman Ibrahim oglu
Gunshot wounds in the chest, stomach and right arm
Gasanov Saib Nasib oglu
Blunt gunshot wound in the head
Gashimov Israfil Agababa oglu
Gunshot wound in the stomach
Huseynov Alimardan Abil oglu
Numerous perforating gunshot wounds
Huseynov Nariman Veli oglu
Numerous gunshot wounds in the area of chest
Aliyev Zakhid Bayram oglu
Gunshot wounds in the right hip
Rustamov Rovshan Mamed oglu
Numerous gunshot wounds in the area of the entire body
Mirzoyev Elchin Huseyngulu oglu
Numerous gunshot wounds
Tokarev Vladimir Ivanovich
Gunshot wound in the trachea
Markhevka Alexander Vitalyevich
Gunshot wound in the chest
Abilgasanov Ilgar Yusif oglu
Gunshot wound in the stomach
Ismailov Rashid Islam oglu
Gunshot wound in the stomach
Eminov Vafadar Osman oglu
Gunshot wound in the stomach
Aliyev Namik Kamil oglu
Gunshot wound in the stomach
Mamedov Sakhavat
Nasibov Allakhyar Iskender oglu
Aliyev Zabulla Kheyrulla oglu
Agahuseynov Agagasan
32 года
Yesemchuk Boris B.
47 years
Abbaskuliyev Sabir Rzagulu oglu
Mirzoyev Vaghif Samed oglu
Gayibov Alesker Yusif oglu
Babayev Shamil Samed oglu
Babayeva Suriya Latif gizi
Khanmamedov Baba Makhmud oglu
Khanmamedov Baba Magomed oglu
Guliyev Movlanverdi Aliverdi oglu
Mamedov Ibish Behbud oglu
Oktay, Medical Institute student
22-25 years
Gasanov Muzafar Gazanfar oglu
Mirzoyev Azad Aliheydar oglu
29 years
Ismaylov Javad Yusif oglu
28 years
Aliyev Khalgai Yusif oglu
Moyerovich Yan Maximovich
Atakishiyev Bakhruz Tofig oglu
Mamedov Eldar Zeynal oglu
Allakhverdiyev Ilham Ajar oglu
Rzaguliyev Sabir Rzagulu oglu
Rzayev Azad Allakhverdi oglu
Isayev Mushfig Agali oglu
Kuliyev Vidadi Vaghif oglu
5th year student
Gajiyev Mubariz Magamed oglu
38 years 1952
Orujiyev Shamsaddin Abdulgasan oglu
Hamidov Izzat Atakishi oglu
Javanshir Ilkin Zulfugar oglu
Novruzov Tofig Heydar oglu
Ismaylov Ramiz Islam oglu
Abdulgasanov Ilgar
Yefimovich Boris Vasilyevich
Girl, 16 years
Male, 25-30 years
Numerous gunshot wounds in the left side of the stomach
Male, 23-30 years (unidentified)
Gunshot wound in the head
Male, 25-30  years (unidentified)
Severe injury
Male, 25-28 years (unidentified)
Gunshot wounds in the back side of the chest
Upper part of a right arm
Male, 35-45 years (unidentified)
Gunshot wounds in the head and body
Male, 35-45 years (unidentified)
Gunshot wounds in the head and body
Babayev Rahim Vaghif oglu
Corpse of an unidentified male, nearly 60 years

"Kill them all, God will recognise His own," Papal legate Amalrich answered in 1209 when crusaders asked how to distinguish Catholics from Cathars.

In the course the well-known events in Berlin on 17 June, 1953, when a real threat of a third world war emerged, from 35 to 70 people (according to different sources) were killed dur-ing the introduction of the Soviet troops.

The introduction of troops in Baku turned out to be more bloody and brutal than that in Czechoslovakia, when 80 people were killed and 722 wounded.

Baku "record" number of victims in the introduction of troops is an "achievement" of Gor-bachev.

Le Monde correspondent in Moscow Bernard Guetta wrote about the tears in the eyes of the General Secretary M. Gorbachev looking at children bodies in Spitak.

However, he would not notice those he had killed in Baku!

Then I answered to my friend,
"Wind, you can make trees bend,
you ascend and you descend,
you have seen so much, I thought…
There's one place you've never been to.
It's Baku you haven't seen!
If you've never seen Baku,
all you've seen before is nought!"

Robert Rozhdestvensky
If You've Never Seen Baku

If only had Robert Rozhdestvensky seen Baku on 21 January, 1990! He might have responded somehow. It is hard to believe, though!

In connection with the tragic events of 20 January, 1990, we recall a scene from the immortal film by G. Chukhray The Forty-First. The heroine (I. Izvitskaya) and the hero (O. Strizhenov) hold a keen political discussion. And all of a sudden, the heroine gives the hero a slap in the face. First reaction of the hero was pain, bewilderment, astonishment, since nothing had pointed to it, and second, now more intelligent, was hatred.

Something like that could be observed in Baku. Gorbachev's barbaric blow was so unexpected that for the first moment people could not believe what had just happened. Everything seemed to be a terrible nightmare, for Gorbachev was striking a blow on the offended party! Then the realization of Gorbachev's deeds came and was followed by hatred. Unlike the hero of the film, the Azerbaijan people will keep hatred for the USSR and its last leaders headed by M. Gorbachev for ever.

Komsomolskaya Pravda wrote on 2 June, 1990, "After the introduction of troops in Baku and declaration of state of emergency there, the public opinion poll showed that 70% of Bakuvians supported the secession of the republic from the Soviet Union and only 10% wanted Azerbaijan to remain a Soviet republic."

One of Azerbaijan's oldest oil workers told me with profound sorrow, "From September 1941 and till the end of 1942 I lived in a small hut at Balakhany oil field (outside Baku) and hardly went home. In my section of the field half of operating wells were constantly blowing out and I was afraid of leaving them even for a short time - the chokes wore out quickly because of appearanceof significant amounts of sand and an accident could happen at any moment. Sometimes it seemed to me, especially at night, that I was going mad, for I began talking to the wells, "Some more, my darling, some more oil, our Red Army needs it, the Soviet people needs it". Little did I know then how the Soviet people, the Red Army would respond to me and my land on January 20, 1990. What that jerk Gorbachev was doing when we gave everything for the victory?" "Plucking hens for fascists," I answered. Annoyed, he looked at me thinking I was joking. When I explained that this is common knowledge, he said just two words in Azerbaijani, "Sozum yoxdur!" (I have nothing more to say) and said no more on the subject.

Gorbachev's meanness and brutality towards the Azerbaijan people can be seen in the fact that the introduction of troops against civilians after the events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia was not considered a tool of preserving the existing regime, it was a different time. Gorbachev made an "exception" for Baku. Primakov recalls, "I was at the meeting in Politburo where Gorbachev told that Ceausescu, writhing in hysterics (it had happened when Warsaw Treaty still had existed), made a request to bring in troops in Romania immediately. But it was not 1968 marked by the tank columns march on Prague but 1990 and everything was confined only to informing the higher Soviet leadership on Ceausescu's appeal; nobody of the present even asked himself about the possibility of military interference in Romania."

In case of Baku, the situation was quite the reverse. Nobody of Gorbachev's circle even asked himself about the efficiency of such rogue action, though it was 1990.

Even Primakov himself, when asked, "You said that policy should be more active. What does it mean in respect to the countries of the Central Europe, Poland in particular? What kind of activity is implied?" answers, "No tanks, certainly. If you have doubts of such kind you should not worry, Russia is not going to do that."

These two facts are extremely informative indicating the attitude of these gentlemen to identical events but for different peoples!

What other facts proving the evident attitude of these, not misters yet but not comrades already, Gorbachev and Primakov towards Baku and the Azerbaijan people do we need?

"Birds have gone away!" A. Vezirov said with emotion when visiting one of the regions of Azerbaijan shortly before the January events, hinting to the abundance of pesticides in Azerbaijan. In continuation of "bird" matter, let us add that instead of harmless birds "vultures have flown in!"

In 1968 when Soviet tanks entered Prague, Czechs were chanting, "Lenin, wake up, Brezhnev has gone insane!" They still believed Lenin. After Soviet tanks rushed in Baku sowing death and destruction, people in Azerbaijan did not already believe anyone and anything that was Soviet.

In his book Diary of the Aide of the USSR President A.S. Chernyayev writes, "21 January, 1990. By the way, Lenin's death date... But it does not look like it. Yesterday morning, the situation in Azerbaijan was SECRETLY (highlighted by the author) discussed in Politburo. At the same time the decision was made to hold the party congress in July." The details of that "Last Supper" will surely sooner or later become known to the Azerbaijan people.

But one thing is clear even today. They were undoubtedly discussing ways to hide the committed crime and the truth from the international community.

As one would expect, Gorbachev's action was supported by many major Western mass media and politicians.

Below are the most typical statements of political figures, representatives of international organizations, mass media about the situation in Azerbaijan (from 18 to 28 January), i.e. the time immediately before the introduction of troops in Baku and the time after it. The range of these statements fluctuates from the firm disapproval of the introduction of troops in Turkey to supporting Gorbachev and more reserved position.

Washington Post (USA), 18 January, 1990 "The reaction of the White House to Gorbachev's resolutions unambiguously demonstrates that the American point of view of Moscow's troubles had undergone some evolution and is now notable for tolerance and diplomatic tact. "We do understand the necessity of restoring order in the situation when order is disturbed," said the spokeswoman of the White House Marlin Fitzwater.

Canberra Times (Australia), 18 January. "Probably more than in any other part of the Soviet Union, the ethnic conflict in Azerbaijan reveals the hopelessness of uniting within the frames of one empire peoples with such racial, religious and cultural differences, and probably, Azerbaijan more than anything else is an illustration of the difficulties Gorbachev faces in his attempt to preserve that empire."

New York Times (USA), 19 January. "This decision of the Soviet leadership taken after 50 people, according to our information, had been killed during the clashes between the Azerbaijani and the Armenians, was firmly approved by various representatives of the Soviet society from different regions of the country polled at the bus stop by the central air terminal where they were leaving the city or arriving.

..But the situation in Azerbaijan became so dangerous that Gorbachev had no choice but to give the order to bring troops in that region."

New York Times (USA), 22 January. "…Sending troops to restore order in the southern Soviet republic Azerbaijan, President Mikhail Gorbachev got involved in a prolonged occupation which, his supporters are afraid, can become his home Afghanistan.

…Moscow will probably manage to contain the events in Azerbaijan but it will be difficult to steer this republic, especially because the still existing People's Front of Azerbaijan promises to mobilize the gloomy people to mass strikes and civil disobedience actions. Even now, the disorders in the southern republics affect adversely the Soviet economy noted for a high degree of planning and specialization.

The turmoil in Azerbaijan might become an effective means of mobilization of Russian nationalists which are already talking with growing anxiety about the danger of being absorbed by the rapidly increasing and menacing Muslim population in their own country."

BBC correspondent M. Saxsmith (London), 19 January. "According to the editorial in Sunday Express, "frankly speaking, Gorbachev had no choice except sending troops. But, as Great Britain in Northern Ireland, he can possibly find that it is easier to bring in troops than to withdraw them." Sunday Telegraph calls Transcaucasia "Soviet Lebanon".

Osservatore Romano (Vatican). "…Fierce centralized political, economic, cultural and linguistic suppression on the part of Moscow that was accompanied by imposing "state atheism" has brought to fierce nationalism in the frames of which religious identity assumed the role of cultural and ethnic reunion. That I what is going on in the forms that sometimes assume so sharp conflict character these days."

Iomiuri (Tokyo), 23 January. "After the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR adopted the tough resolution demanding withdrawal of all troops from Baku within two days, actually "ultimatum" for Moscow, events in Azerbaijan developed into the confrontation between M.S. Gorbachev's administration and this Transcaucasian republic. According the Constitution of the USSR, a Soviet republic has no right to decline a Resolution of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council. But the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan used the clause of the republican constitution approved in November 1989 saying that "preference is given to the republic laws the Union laws" as a legal basis to render the Resolution unlawful.

According to the local sources, the republican authorities have already begun preparation for carrying out of a national referendum on the secession of Azerbaijan from the USSR."

"The actions of the Supreme Council of the Azerbaijan SSR," Moscow correspondent of Tokyo Shimbun points out, "mean that ethnic conflicts in the Caucasus have entered a new stage, developing into the confrontation between the Kremlin and the national and state structure of Azerbaijan. Besides, in the situation when on the eve of the forthcoming plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the counterattack of conservative groupings gains strength, the above-mentioned resolution will inevitably strike even more serious blow on the foundation of M.S. Gorbachev's power."

New York Times (USA), 20 January. "Since the very beginning of ethnic clashes in Transcaucasia between the Armenians and the Azerbaijani, Bush administration, when considering Gorbachev's situation, have been feeling helpless and at the same time profoundly concerned."

The English Guardian was impartially covering the events in Baku; its correspondents had been invited by the opposition despite Vezirov's fierce resistance.

Turkish mass media and politicians also showed important and priceless support to the Azerbaijan people concerning the January tragedy.

New York Times (USA), 24 January, on the reaction of Turkey. "According to diplomats and officials, the local authorities are displeased with the USA and other Western countries supporting the Soviet intervention in Azerbaijan, alleging that these responses are based on double standard or the total lack of standards and reflect, as a government employee had it, "political and religious bias" towards Muslims. Thus, the Soviet action has driven a wedge between Washington and its close ally.

…As the crisis was getting aggravated, the Turkish officials expressed growing indignation at the Western estimate of the causes of the conflict, as in their opinion this estimate is biased."

Statement of Turkey representative in NATO U. Unsal.

1. Turkey expects the countries members of NATO to pay the same attention to the events in Azerbaijan as they do to "nationalistic movements" in the Soviet Baltic republics and to confirm thereby that the alliance does not pursue double standard policy.

2. Western mass media reflect only the viewpoint of the Armenian side. Turkey believes that the approach of the Azerbaijani side is also of great importance. The West cannot draw the right conclusion based on unilateral information.

3. Despite the serious concern about the events in Azerbaijan, Turkey believes that they are internal affairs of the Soviet Union.

According to the newspaper, representatives of other members of the alliance did not express their attitude towards Unsal's statement. Observers believe that "such silence is explained by the fact that the countries have not yet determined their position on Azerbaijan's problem."

Anatolia Agency (Turkey), 24 January. "Minister of foreign affairs Mesut Yilmaz stressed in his speech that "the longstanding discord between the Azerbaijani and the Armenians has resulted in the confrontation between the Azerbaijan people and the Soviet Union leadership. The unlawful actions that led to the declaration of state of emergency and then to bloodshed are no secret. Everyone is well aware that the source of the events is Armenia's claims on Azerbaijan lands, as well as use of force and provocations aimed at the realization of those claims." Pointing out the pro-Armenian position of Western mass media, Yilmaz said that "we continue to regard these events as an internal affair of the USSR. It does not mean, however, that we are going to remain indifferent to the Azerbaijan people which lives across our borders with the Soviet Union and is close to us in cultural respect and with which we want to keep good relationship."

Turkish Daily News published the editorial of Ilnur Chevik under the headline West Applauds Suppression of the Azerbaijani. In particular, it says, "When the Soviet tanks and troops crossed Czechoslovakian border in 1968 the Western countries responded to it with rage and expressed their protest to Moscow… Now, some time later, the very Red Army made its way to Azerbaijan, killing Azerbaijani nationalists, while the West that has always been talking of human rights is applauding it loudly."

The Turkish observer Mehmet Ali Birand, speaking of the events in Azerbaijan, writes in Milliyet that "Moscow has lost Azerbaijan for a long time." The sensitivity of Ankara concerning the events in Azerbaijan, he points out, is symbolized by the fact that after an hour and a half conversation between the minister of foreign affairs Mesut Yilmaz and the USSR ambassador to Ankara a three lines-long statement was issued. Our message is as follows. "Yes, these events are your internal affair. We do not interfere and watch it with compassion. But if you continue to suppress the Azerbaijani and shed their blood we will not keep silent."

Turkish Daily News, 25 January. "As everything is falling apart, the Western and Eastern countries have come together to form a "Christian union" against the Islamic community which numbers about 1.5 billion people. Using theses of perestroika and glasnost for propaganda purposes, the USSR says that it observes human rights but at the same time resorts to double standard. The USSR is tolerant towards Christians but pursues tough policy in regard to Muslims. There is danger that the number of victims might increase up to 4,000 people. The Western Europe, the USA and the Christian church supports the slaughter of a Muslim people."

The plenum of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee convened immediately after the January events also demonstrated silent consent with Gorbachev's actions.

TASS reports. On 20 January the meeting of the Bureau of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee was held, where the current situation in the republic was considered. The attention of party committees is concentrated on taking all necessary measures to prevent escalation of tension and stabilize the situation in the republic. The plenum decided it necessary to analyze the causes of the events deeply and comprehensively.

The Bureau of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee expressed its condolences concerning the human victims. Three days of mourning has been announced in the republic.

Due to the discharge of Comrade Vezirov A.-R.K. from the post of the first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, the management of the Bureau work is entrusted to the Bureau members Comrades Mutalibov A.N., the Chairman of the Supreme Council of Azerbaijan, and Polyanichko V.P., the second secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee."

Gorbachev had accomplices in Azerbaijan as well. At the plenum of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee convened immediately after the January events, on of the party officials said, "Many emotions have been vented from this rostrum, we are all horrified. Our international Baku is covered with blood. I condemn bloodshed. We should have warned the people, but who is to blame? Isn't it ourselves? Aren't we the coathors of this tragedy? You say that the troops must go away. But it is an illusion, comrades, that we will be able to hold power in our hands, since extremists have formed such forces that they might begin terror in the city tomorrow."

This speaker voiced the position of Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee.

Numerous attempts of individual members of the plenum to condemn the Centre for this bloody action were firmly suppressed by the presidium. We should say that materials of that plenum have also disappeared mysteriously.

None of the Bureau members came to the funeral of shekhids on 22 January to lead the funeral train. it was only on 27 January (seven days after the tragedy!) that the condolences of the Central Committee was published in the official state newspaper Bakinsky Rabochiy. The party elite did nothing even to arrange the funeral, nor did the city committee of the party, the Central Committee, the Council of Ministers; everyone stepped aside.

Here is the estimate of A. Vezirov's activities made by the commission set up immediately after the bloody events of 20 January. Below are the basic points of that document.

"The commission set up by the plenum of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee held on the night of 25 January, 1990 checked the activities of Comrade Vezirov A.K. in the post of the first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee."

"Virtually deceiving the members of the Bureau of the Central Committee, Vezirov assured before his trip to the meeting of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council in January 1989 that any new compromise on Nagorno-Karabakh issue was out of question.

In reality, it was his unprincipled consent that gave the official start to the idea of establishing the Committee of Special Administration of NKAO.

At the meeting of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council on 12 January 1989, he said, "The appointment of Comrade Volsky A.I. to the post of the representative of the CPSU Central Committee and Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council in NKAO was undoubtedly a useful action. But in our opinion, the potential of the representative were not used to its full extent, among other things, owing to the limitation of his actual authority, the small size of the apparatus, and first of all to the open resistance to his activities on the part of the corrupted and nationalistic forces in NKAO.

Nevertheless, we can consider the right direction of the compromise found. But we should go further…

That is why we support the establishment of a temporary committee or organization bureau to administer the region by the resolution of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council and Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Council."

On his return from Moscow with the adopted resolution on the establishment the Committee of Special Administration of NKAO, Comrade Vezirov A.K. held an urgent meeting of party activists of Baku to make an impression that his activity was approved. The meeting was announced as republican in the press, and the resolution of Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Council dated 13 January, 1990 was actually post factum.

Then he took the course for the reduction of involvement of republican bodies in the problem of the autonomous oblast. "We should begin to forget NKAO in the press etc. and work," he said at the meeting of the Bureau of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee on 9 March, 1989. The orders followed, "If only I hear that even one deputy minister or a minister… deals with NKAO issue, I am telling you, we will dismiss that minister. And you will receive a reprimand, and so will the heads of the Council of Ministers and the ministries for the deviation from the course. Let us establish the following order. Each of the secretaries sends for his subordinates and says that no one should call to NKAO without him… I want the ministers and other comrades to know that no one but secretaries and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers should contact the leadership of NKAO and discuss matters."

That virtually relieved the republican bodies and Vezirov personally of the responsibility for the solution of NKAO problem. However, time proved the short-sightedness and fallibility of such approach. Nationalistic and extremist forces in the autonomous oblast made use of the republic's actually total lack of influence on the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and consolidated their positions by putting more pressure on the Committee of Special Administration.

The economy of NKAO was actually out of control of the republican bodies, relations with the oblast were broken on all levels, and an alternative unconstitutional and anti-Soviet body of authority was established in its political structure, National Council of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast…

At the meeting of the Bureau of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee on 5 December, 1988, the issue "One urgent measures on solving the problems of citizens that were forced to leave their habitual residence" was discussed with participation of the deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Comrade Scherbina B.Y. Comrade Vezirov A.K. said, "I am not sure whether we should ask for assistance of the fraternal republics. I think they all have many problems of their own… So we should rely solely on ourselves… I assure Boris Yevdokimovich… it is our attitude, we do not ask anything from the country unless we are really dying."

As a result, the resolution passed by the Bureau of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee on the given issue did not solve primary problems of refugees, shifting the responsibility for their settlement on the local party and Soviet bodies, orienting to render the refugees temporary assistance.

During the year and a half of Comrade Vezirov A.K. in the position of the first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, 80% first secretaries, every sixth second secretary, every tenth secretary of city and district committees of the party were replaced, as well as a quarter of senior officials of party committees, every third chairman of executive committees of city and district Councils of people's deputies, many heads of ministers and departments.

In 1988, 14 people were co-opted to the posts of first secretaries of city and district committees, in 1989, after party conferences, another 14 of first secretaries and 16 other secretaries and party committess were co-opted.

As a result of such approach, many important positions turned out to be occupied by incompetent and insufficiently experienced in political and party activities and even casual employees that did not enjoy the people's confidence…

At the April (1989) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee he said, "Active solutions of specific social and economic issues, upholding internationalist positions and general interests of the party and the state… helped us recover, return the confidence of masses, win them over to our side. And the people followed us. The evidence of it is the results of the election of the USSR people's deputies. 98.5% voters took part in the poll."

Without a shadow of confusion, Comrade Vezirov A.K. called upon the central party publications, departments of the CPSU Central Committee for summarizing the experience of conducting elections in the republic.

His individual decision to use force in Jalilabad region on the night of 29 December actually frustrated the session of the Supreme Council.

Knowing for sure about the forthcoming introduction of troops in Baku and the possible use of weapons by them, Comrade Vezirov A.K. concealed it from the most members of the Bureau of the Central Committee. On 19 January, maintaining somehow one-way communication with the secretaries of the Central Committee, he never informed them of the introduction of troops at night. Thereby the opportunity to remove the people from street posts was ruled out and the tragic fate of many of them was predetermined.

Displaying criminal cowardice, Comrade Vezirov A.K. actually fled from the republic at its tragic moment, disgracefully leaving his people to the mercy of fate."

Members of candidate members
of the Azerbaijan Communist
Party Central Committee
R. Akhundov
T. Kocharli
N. Kush
L. Rasulova
Y. Rustamov
Chairman of the Auditing
Committee of the Azerbaijan
Communist Party Central
M. Kaziyev

The author was not a Communist and does not believe he has the right to estimate party documents deeply but one thing about that document is evident. It is an attempt to lump all responsibility on one man. This stereotype worked out by the Communists through many years, to find the chief and sole culprit, worked out that time, which was the last one in the history of the Azerbaijan Communist Party.

To be impartial, the author deems it necessary to add the following to the resolution of the commission.

In the late forties one of the first postwar contests among the republics of Transcaucasia and Moldavia took place in Baku. Basketball match between the national teams of Azerbaijan and Armenia. As was common those years, the audience surrounded the basketball pitch in a narrow circle supporting teams all together. It was an uncompromising fight point to point. Suddenly two Armenian players started arguing rather sharply about some moment of the match. A third played ran up to them at once and said in Russian for some reason, "You can curse me, you can beat me, but I'm begging you, just play. Don't forget it is Azerbaijan we're playing against!" This expression was a model of actions against the Azerbaijani in any circumstances!

Armenia used this model in this conflict in contemporary history as well. The authority and the opposition were leading an uncompromising struggle between themselves, quarreling, fighting, killing each other but unlike Baku, neither forgot that they were "playing" against Azerbaijan!

The situation was different in Baku those years. The struggle between the authority and the opposition here was much more vehement than that against the Armenian aggressors. Here is one example typical of that period. The author happened to spend several evenings at supper with one of the opposition leaders, as our common friends had arrived from Moscow. During these suppers he picked all representatives of the authority to pieces with bare hatred. And it is significant that the author did not hear any wordy speech about Armenian aggressors, not a single time in all those evenings, just in passing! Afterwards, that politician turned from a radical oppositionist into a "goody" oppositionist when he got completely lost.

L. Yunusova characterized A. Vezirov with one very precise phrase in those years, "He is not a man of stagnation period, no, he is from pre-stagnation times."

Just like most Komsomols by birth, Vezirov was not stranger to populism, but even that populism was kind of obsolete.

Alexander Kiknadze writes in his book Baku Horseshoe, "When he (Vezirov - Author) worked in Kirovabad, he used to invite Pahmutova and Dobronravov, Niyazi and Fikret Amirov, Yan Frenkel and Muslim Magomayev, Rashid Beybutov and Josef Kobzon to the parties he arranged. They responded without thinking too much… Dmitry Kobalevsky wrote in his book, "I would be happy if such song days as in Kirovabad were held in other cities and towns of the Soviet Union and if every city had such House of Music."

Many of those above-mentioned responded to the invitations from Kathmandu. Ballet of Bolshoi Theatre of the USSR with its director Yuri Grigorovich, Rashid Beybutov Song Theatre, Azerbaijan Dance Group, artistic collectives and sporting teams from many Soviet republics have been there.

"Vezirov says hello to you," Robert Rozhdestvensky called me. "You should see with your own eyes what he has done in such a short time. He did invite you, why are you still at home?"

He tried to return to those model cultural actions of the Soviet times after he had been appointed the first secretary in Azerbaijan.

Azerbaijanis are driven away from Armenia in volume, shooting can already be heard in NKAO, while Vezirov talks about computerization of motor-cars, necessity of building baths, suggests planting chestnut trees, calls upon the party officials to come to dance together with their wives etc.

At the meeting with intellectuals of Baku he says that he arranged that a big group of writers, composers, artists etc. should soon arrive from Moscow. And in his every speech, like Senator Cato, Vezirov mentioned mafia forces in Baku.

Friendship of peoples was sacred to him. He hugged one Armenian at the radio manufacturing plant and exclaimed, "We have been brothers for a hundred and fifty years, so let us continue being brothers!"

Yelena Bonner-Alikhanyan recalls the meeting in Baku, "In December 1988 a group of Muscovites together with Sakharov was with a visit in Transcaucasia. Meeting with the first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee. Vezirov has been giving us a lecture on Azerbaijan-Armenian friendship for two hours on end, as if he was on stage. Andrey Dmitriyevich broke through his roaring voice of a real speaker with a great difficulty. We told why we had come. He did not seem to notice, began about friendship again, "We are fraternal peoples."

Alexander Kiknadze writes in his book Baku Horseshoe that when Vezirov came to work in Azerbaijan, the Central Command of Armed Forces of the Russian Federation addressed him with the following words, "We highly appreciate Your contribution to the settlement of Afghan issue and assistance to the servicemen of the Armed Forces in the period of Your service as ambassador in Pakistan…" Little time will pass and they will "thank" him in the full measure, he would wish it had never happened! In one word, VEZIROV WAS NOT THE KIND OF MAN AZERBAIJAN NEEDED AT THAT DIFFICULT TIME. Instead of adjusting to the troubled time, he was trying to use the determined administrative methods of the Soviet time, i.e. was dealing with totally different matter.

Certainly, Vezirov, with his theatrical policy, was most responsible of the events on the Azerbaijan side. But a natural question arises here. Where were the rest of the republic's leaders? Why didn't any of them stand out? Why didn't his circle put the weak-willed Vezirov in his proper place and take the lead? Because everyone was playing their own game and tried to frame another!

We all know that history does not bear subjunctive mood. What would have happened if H. Aliyev had been in power those years? It is hard to give a comprehensive answer to this question but one thing leaves no doubt, there would have been no such nightmare!

In September 1990, after comprehending what had happened, the first deputy head of the Azerbaijan KGB Yevgeny Dybrovin voiced the official stand of the leaders, the leaders of this organization, let us stress it, on the events of 20 January in Baku.

"Most active representatives of the extremist wing of the People's Front led the people to barricades and fled themselves. They are to be liable for that. And their liability before the families of the victims is even greater. Some of those "leaders" have been arrested, the rest managed to escape. It does matter to us whether they might resume their previous activities, so we are taking measures to find them. As for Etibar Mamedov, Rahim Kaziyev, Khalil Rza, Magomed Gatami, the investigation of their cases is complete." It was not the stand of most rank-and-file Azerbaijan KGB agents. Some of them rejected it openly, some left the organization in protest. According to Dubrovin, there are no one to blame except those mentioned above!

By the way, none of the outstanding political figures and scientist functionaries (we emphasize, scientist functionaries) declared in those tragic days, "I am first of all an Azerbaijani and then a Communist…" In the bloody January days of 1990 some of them burned their party cards before TV camera, others returned them but in several months they took their cards back, now without TV cameras. As Leyla Yunusova said wittily, "the totally ruined Communist Party rises like Phoenix from the ashes of the burnt party cards."

But it did not rise. After 20 January it lost the remaining authority once and for all; even the insignificant handful of loyal Communists lost their faith in the Party. It was the reason why even the weak-willed Mutalibov disbanded it with a stroke of the pen and it all passed unnoticed and ordinarily.

The great mistake of the new first secretary Mutalibov was his trying to keep up depressed mourning mood of the population of Baku after 20 January, 1990. All his speeches had rather mournful and meek about them; he never finished them with an appeal for further struggle, for confrontation. He was not with the people, but with its grief, which undoubtedly affected his future career.

In this difficult situation, the Chairman of Presidium of the Azerbaijan SSR Supreme Council Kafarova E.M. was acting with dignity. In her radio appearance on 20 January, 1990 she voiced her resolute protest against the fragrant violation of the republic's sovereignty and declaration of state of emergency in Baku. Kafarova E.M. said bindingly that the authority bodies and administration of Azerbaijan had not made any decision about the declaration of state of emergency and had never given their consent to such a decision.

There were then and there are still now questions about the tragic events of 20 January to ask the opposition leaders.

According to Z. Alizade, when at the meeting of the People's Front of Azerbaijan on the events of 20 January, 1990 one of the People's Front functionaries said, "Gentlemen, we should admit our defeat" he was immediately called a KGB agent. It was a pet maneuver of that time. If you are not a radical, then you are a KGB agent!

On 20 January, 1990, there were heroes who were far from politics but were the first to rise on the way of tanks, while there was no leader either in the authority or in the opposition who "would be the first to stand out". One of the opposition leaders says that "the people were driven to face tanks by his "double" from the KGB", another does not hide that he had been imperturbably having tea at his accomplice's, etc.

The famous physicist Enrico Fermi, living in the safe America during the Second World War, said that "it is impossible to stop science" when the Americans dropped nuclear bombs on Japan. On 20 January, 1990 when peaceful people were being crushed by Soviet tanks, one of the opposition leaders I. Gambar, having tea in a safe place, said that "it is impossible to stop the process of collapse of the Soviet empire".

L. Yunusova writes concerning the events of 20 January, 1990, "A member of the board of the People's Front Sabir Rustamkhanly asks in his article (Azerbaijan, 24 February, 1990), "Who could imagine that the army would enter the city without state of emergency being declared… That all branches of armed forces would be thrown onto the city with two-million population. Who could imagine that the people leading political struggle would be represented by an armed gang preparing a coup d'etat… That neither children, nor women or men would be spared. Who could imagine that the game would be played on the level of the CPSU Central Committee and the Supreme Council… Who could imagine that the army meant to defend the people against the external enemies would be so ruthless to its own people?" If such thoughts did not occur to you, moreover, if you foresaw such course of events, then You are definitely out of your proper place. You can be an excellent writer and not realize that if personally your books are published, personally you and your family are not in a camp or killed, that does not mean the state we live in stopped being totalitarian, fascist, antinational and its policy and army are not directed at the suppression of its own people…

If they did not surmise it, did not realize it, then they have no idea of the existing system, political situation in the country. If they do not understand, if they are unaware, then they are not ready to confront it. That is why, in my opinion, they deserve criticism and condemnation. They, who spoke for the people, gained its endless confidence and failed to save it."

She is unquestionably right.

Embarking on the path of politics, one should always remember that one assumes enormous responsibility for the fates of the people who followed and believed; words like "who could imagine" do not relieve a politician of his responsibility, moreover, they increase it.

We should point out with great regret that the reaction of the official Turkey to the bloody introduction of Soviet troops in Baku was rather difficult to understand in the beginning. We must repeat, the official Turkey! In particular, after the introduction of Soviet troops in Baku in January 1990, Turgut Ozal who was then on official visit in the USA said that "…Turkey should not interfere in these events, since it is a different country". At least, this is what Panorama, N1 (35), July 1993 wrote. As they say, a word dropped from a song (about brotherhood) makes it all wrong. Meanwhile dozens of Turkish correspondents risked their lives getting into Baku in various ways to cover these tragic events impartially. Dozens of thousands of common Turks gathered for marches in support of the Azerbaijan people.

We are obliged to Gorbachev for the bloody events of 20 January. But why were these events not condemned definitely and unambiguously by different political forces, intellectuals and finally, why did Russian Orthodox Church not say its word of condemnation?

Speaking on the action of NATO in the former Yugoslavia, Patriarch Alexius said, "NATO bombs are alleged to have writings on them, "Here is your orthodox holiday's gift". It is a blasphemy!" Yes, it is blasphemous indeed if there was ever such writing. But is it so? For this is what the Serbian propaganda asserts that has adopted much from Goebbels's. Alexius, however, does not mention a single word about the fact that there were orthodox crosses on the Armenian tanks that crushed and killed the civilian population of the Azerbaijan Khojaly, and the images were broadcast on the Central Television.

We have questions on the bloody events in Baku to ask the European Parliament as well. Moscow News wrote those years that the European Parliament demanded introduction of troops in Azerbaijan on 18 January, 1990. Many things remain unclear in the matter, there could be certain facts kept secret!

There were and there still are today questions to the US President Bush Sr. One of the most mysterious talks between Gorbachev and Bush took place in Malta, the place where the well-known the Order of Knights of Malta had been founded that had long since been considered the centre of the world Freemasonry. The Turkish newspapers Turk, 1 December, 1989 and Gunaydin, 3 December, 1989 were saying directly that Azerbaijan's problems had been also touched upon at the meeting of the USA and the USSR leaders in Malta. The meetings took place on the board of ships, against the wash of the waves, so to say. There was a mini-delegation of Armenians inside Gorbachev's delegation: Shakhnazarov, Aganbegyan, Sitaryan. It is difficult to say anything definite without knowing the subject of those talks; as time passed, though, it was clear that it was after Malta that Gorbachev's attitude to Azerbaijan toughened, which leaves little doubt as what that mini-delegation had been doing there.

H. Kasparov also "contributed" to the interpretation of the bloody events in Baku on 20 January, 1990.

In 1989 the author was invited to Chess Olympics in Thessalonica to deliver lectures on computerization of chess lessons and witnessed numerous interviews given by Kasparov to foreign journalists about the events in Sumgayit, all the blame for which he laid on the Azerbaijani side. He spoke every evening on Greek TV channels from anti-Azerbaijan stand, virtually saying noting on chess, for which he actually had come to Thessalonica.

Despite his numerous anti-Azerbaijan statements, he had no problem in Baku in the well-known difficult days. He could have moved from Baku with his relatives whenever and wherever he wanted; still, having close contacts with the KGB and not wishing to dramatize the situation in Baku, he chose a different way.

The head of Z department of the KGB Vladimir Lutsenko and the head of the section Valery Khmelev write, "The Kasparovs, for one, Garry, his wife, mother, grandmother were first secretly (?! it was well-known to all chess players of Baku - Author) taken out to the KGB health resort Bilga. Then, with every precaution measure, to the airport and sent to Moscow by special flight (?! it was one of the shuttle flights used to throw special mission units in Baku - Author) on Tu-134."

This artificial incident was later spread through all information channels and inflicted serious informational damage on Azerbaijan.

Whether Kasparov wanted or not, in the bloody events of 20 January, 1990 in Baku he acted in unison with the red-brown forces.

In future, Kasparov spread his anti-Azerbaijan activities all around the world. Wherever he arrived with whatever purposes, be it participation in chess competitions, lectureship, competition with computers etc., he would never "forget" about Azerbaijan.

i magazine, N19, 19 May, 1999, writes that in the late April 1990 Garry Kasparov took part in the two major scientific conventions in the USA where he delivered two lectures: one in Stanford, on the limits of human potential in sports, and the second in Oregon under the code name Chess, Politics and Computers. According to the magazine, in this "lecture" the account of the tragic events in Baku in January 1990 was interwoven with the assessment of the recent events in Kosovo.

"When the end of the Soviet Empire drew closer, the Communist government made the last attempt to hold control in its hands, inspiring ethnic clashes and mutinies. One of the bloodiest conflicts emerged between Azerbaijan and Armenia concerning Nagorno-Karabakh. Tragically, this conflict was not confined to disputes and discord but turned into a genocide against the Armenians in several large cities of Azerbaijan which reached Baku… It is too bad that I did not have a chance to return where I had been born and where my father, my two grandfathers and grandmother are buried. Some expected me to leave the USSR immediately after that terrible event… The empire crumbled losing its national territories but my place is the country of my mother tongue and until I am made to leave I will stay there. Of course, I love Armenia and Israel very much and I have been doing my best to assist the Armenians in their fair struggle for Karabakh and I continue to support my people living in Israel in every way…"

When living in Baku, living like a prince, we should say, no one ever heard a single word of love for Armenia or Israel from him, at least not in public; he swore his love for Azerbaijan then. At one of Komsomol congresses of Azerbaijan he said, "This blessed land raised me and set me on my feet… If we liken the political word to a game of chess, then it is hard to find a better Grand Master than H.Aliyev."

There are plenty of such statements of his about Azerbaijan.

Kasparov needs Azerbaijan no longer, for he got everything he wanted here at his time. Now he is interested in Jewish and Armenian lobbies, since their positions in the world are quite strong, and he has always been striving after strength and benefit!

As for his relatives' graves, including that of his uncle which he did not mention, Leonid Veinstein, very decent and respectable man, one of founders of KVN TV show in Azerbaijan, they are all right, they are well-attended, while Kasparov shows his interest just for effect!

In any civilized and not even very civilized country, the mass death of civilians, like that in Baku during the intrusion of the Soviet troops, would result in setting up an authoritative all-Union commission. It was not set up, according to A. Melikov, though, it was the blame of the local authorities that hasted to set up one of their own. As one would expect, it proved to be inefficient and neither the all-Union or international community considered its opinion. It is well-known that the authority of commission member is one of the primary conditions of recognizing its results.

Afterwards, instead of showing repentance or at least seeking some compromising approaches to the January tragedy in Baku, Gorbachev and his henchmen arranged a dirty show against Baku, spitting in the soul of the Azerbaijan people and insulting the memory of those killed during the intrusion of the Soviet troops into Baku in January 1990.

It was finally evident that this man who had sold his soul to the devil hated the Azerbaijan intensely and did not feel guilty of his deeds, moreover, on the contrary was proud of them. He did not even pretend, for the sake of propriety like Primakov did, to be upset about the innocent victims.

The author remembers well that as soon as the live broadcast of the first congress of the USSR people's deputies opened on 25 May, 1989 began and the official opening was announced, an unannounced deputy mounted the rostrum and suggested one minute's silence in remembrance of Tbilisi victims. And the present, though not all at once and not even all, rose. Then Sobchak, a famous writer Vasilyev and others put that issue on the agenda. Like many citizens of the republic, the author expected Azerbaijan deputies make Gorbachev discuss the events of 20 January, 1990 in Baku at the next congress of the USSR people's deputies at any cost, event attempting to wreck the congress. Unfortunately, it did not happen, as Gorbachev stopped all weak attempts of Azerbaijan deputies to raise the issue and they gave it up ("They want to discuss the death of Azerbaijanis and do not want to discuss the murders of Armenians," Gorbachev said provocatively.). He sent his toadies to the rostrum who sold him out afterwards, which is hardly blameworthy, for it is exactly the case of two birds of a feather!

At that time, however, they were playing the part Gorbachev had given them.

Minister of internal affairs of the USSR Vadim Bakatin exclaimed at the congress provocatively, "Recently, another barbaric crime against the Armenian people has been solved. Bodies of twelve Armenian disabled were found in vicinity of Ganja, the murder has been solved, offenders arrested." It was a blatant lie, since no one ever murdered any disabled in Ganja! Thanks for not saying "babies"! Amazing enough, when delivering his speech, Bakatin resembled Goebbels, both outwardly and by his manner of speaking!

"The authorities keep silent," Gorbachev interrupted Bakatin, "but at the same time the Central Committee admitted itself that nothing could change unless Azerbaijan was cleared of People's Front extremists. They all have been terrorized from top to bottom. They demanded holding at gunpoint the chairman of the Supreme Council of Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic, who is a woman by the way, that she signed the document on the secession of Nakhchivan from the USSR…"

"They did not keep silent, Mikhail Sergeyevich," minister of internal affairs of the USSR continued, "for instance, they protested rather loudly when Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council declared state of emergency in Baku. So it is not silence. It is a stand that fully coincides with that of the People's Front extremists."

Minister of defence Dmitry Yazov suddenly said in his report, "On the eve of Baku events, gangsters robbed arsenals of frontier posts… In other place, they stole 133 submachine-guns, 500 grenades, huge amounts of ammunition… In Agdam Azerbaijanis attacked the radiolocation platoon. They tied up the soldiers, took 40 submachine-guns and disabled the radiolocation station…"

Members of the People's Front of Azerbaijan did seize certain amount of weapons from the Soviet Army but militants both in Armenia and NKAO seized virtually all armament that was in their territory.

Still, even if Azerbaijanis attacked the radiolocation platoon in Agdam, tied up the soldiers, took 40 submachine-guns and disabled the radiolocation station, does it mean that it was necessary to kill the innocent citizens of Baku?

After Yazov's words Azerbaijani deputies left the meeting room. It is a pity! They should have tried together to pull Yazov down from the rostrum; that would have been a token gesture!

Meanwhile, Yazov continued, "I wish they were not leaving, I would like to remind to them of the downright sacrilege when 150 graves were dug for 49 bodies. All this was done to decline the responsibility. Well-thought rumours that pursued propaganda purposes were broadcast and pulished immediately." Isn't he a scamp, even insulting the memory of the dead!

Watching from his helicopter the murder of Baku civilians, Yazov did not even know the exact number of the killed! Or he rather knew but lied.

One had the impression that those villains regretted only not having killed half of Baku!

"In 1990 reports appeared in the Western press that in the thick of the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict a group of Islamic fundamentalists had tried to seize a depot not far from Baku," a correspondent inquires from the officer who was in charge of nuclear weapons storages at that time, calling him "S". "I know nothing about this," the officer answers. It is well-known who arranged such "leakage" of classified information if necessary. And it used to happen in the past, this "leakage", or rather "canard", worked.

Due to the leakage, American senators, not without pressure on the part of the Armenian lobby, took up a provocative stand on the events of 20 January; they were immediately supported by the adventurer (according to many Russian journalists) academician Y. Velikhanov. Moscow News wrote on 4 March, 1990 about the concern of American lawmakers about the fate of about 100 nuclear weapons stored near Baku. In this connection Academician Yevgeny Velikhanov argued that "the presence of strategic objects in the area of Baku was of quite great importance in the decision on the introduction of troops."

The author remembers well Velikhanov appearance on the Central Television in the seventies; he was drawing some diagrams and said that SDI was another bluff of the American military, as he served the CPSU Central Committee hard and foot. Then SDI turned out to be the technology of the future and Velikhanov changed into a toady of American senators.

"Some people can breathe in any conditions by depriving others of oxygen," believes Stepan Korshunov in his article Amphibian Academician devoted to Velikhanov.

In those tragic days of Baku Academician Y. Velikhanov was among those who deprived Baku of oxygen.

The USSR was falling apart. Virtually all republics had nuclear weapons and some of them (e.g. Ukraine and Kazakhstan) had means of its supply in broad strategic direction. However, troops were not brought in any of the Soviet republics for this reason; if there were problems, they were solved in a civilized way.

When it became clear that it would not be able to hide the crimes of the Soviet Army from the international community, Moscow made a decision due to the mass death of civilians in Baku to send a joint group of investigators of the USSR Public Prosecutor's Office, Chief Military Prosecutor's Office etc. The group of 39 people was to investigate the crimes committed by the servicemen of airborne forces in the territory of Baku on 19-20 January, 1990, mainly Lebed's division. The impressive team of law enforcement bodies arrived in Baku:

Abramov I.P., deputy Prosecutor General of the USSR, Frolov, deputy Military Prosecutor of the USSR, Provotorov V.G., the head of department of Chief Prosecutor's Office, Kislykh G.V., deputy head of the KGB investigating department, IvanovV.I., the military prosecutor of Transcaucasian military district, Maximov V.V., head of the General Maintenance of Public Order Department of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, Klimov N.A., deputy military prosecutor of Transcaucasian military district, Oreshkin G.I., senior operative officer at large of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, and many others.

But such an impressive composition of justice team that arrived in Baku proved to be another big bluff, the mountain has brought forth a mouse!

According to one of the heads of the Azerbaijan SSR Public Prosecutor's Office, investigators had ready sheets titled "The list of crimes committed by the servicemen of airborne forces in the territory of Baku on 19-20 January, 1990". Materials about hundreds killed and wounded, racketeering, theft, pillage etc. were collected in accordance with this list. All these materials made dozens of volumes. Even a quick overview of those volumes demonstrated (which was confirmed in private conversations by some of these investigators who still had their shame) that all officers of arms of the Soviet Army that had occupied Baku was to be arrested and convicted. What was the result of this action in practice? Nothing! NOT A SINGLE SERVICEMAN WAS PUNISHED!

Here is an example of "investigation" of the events of 20 January, 1990.

The reply of the deputy military prosecutor of Transcaucasian military district Colonel Justice I. Klimov to the people's deputy of the USSR Melikov A.D characterizes the attitude of the Soviet justice to the January events.

Public Prosecutor's Office of the USSR
______ 7 February, 1990
N70, Tbilisi
comrade MELIKOV A.D.

Referring to Your letter of 5 February, 1990, I inform You that the units of the Soviet Army and internal troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs did not intrude into Baku on the night of 20 January of this years but were brought in to secure the state of emergency de-clared by the Resolution of Presidium of the USSR Supreme Council, 19 January, 1990.

The military units and stations located in the city of Baku were blocked in the mid-January by motor-cars and other vehicles and also numerous groups of people.

During the introduction of troops in Baku as well as unblocking of the military, the city military personnel was exposed to an organized attack on the part of extremist militants, which resulted in the death of servicemen. With the purpose of repelling the armed attack, the service-men were forced to open return fire.

There were no cases of looting, i.e. stealing personal belongings of the killed and wounded, committed by servicemen.

Criminal cases of the offences committed by servicemen (stealth of state property, motor transport offences) are undergoing investigation with the purpose of solving the issue of bringing the guilty ones to criminal liability.

Deputy military prosecutor of Transcaucasian military district
Colonel Justice I. Klimov

The only question is whether there is more lie, hypocrisy or insolence in this reply! All volumes, 69 out of 108, the most important of them, were thievishly taken out to Moscow and safely hidden there. It appears that this action had far-reaching aims of revealing the truth and… hiding it safely. Later, a message flashed in the Russian mass media that during the presidential elections in Russia Yeltsin's people had used those materials to curb Lebed's election enthusi-asm. Different people parted with Baku in different ways. Yesenin said his tender and gentle good-bye to Baku with love.

Good-bye, Baku! So, I shall never see you…
And I'm afraid of fate, my southern land.
The heart is under hand and it's so near.
And now I feel two simple words: my friend.
Good-bye, Baku! Oh, Turkic sky, good-bye!
The blood is very cold, I'm weak, you see…
But I can promise you, I'll keep in mind
The tender wave of Caspian great sea.
Good-bye, Baku! Good-bye, my simple song…
For the last time I'll hug my friend, I'll stroke
His head. It's like a golden rose. So long
It'll nod to me in choking lilac smoke…

Taking rest in the suburb of Baku in 1924, surrounded by hospitable Bakuvians, Yesenin wrote 46 poems which were published in Bakinsky Rabochiy.

Parting with Baku, the Soviet troops said their good-bye leaving devastation and blood. They insulted the memory of those Soviet soldiers and officers that had saved, as we are firmly convinced, the mankind from fascism and whose memory had always been cherished in Azerbaijan.

Let us say several words about the Soviet and then Russian Army in connection with the gangster action of the Soviet Army in Baku on 20 January, 1990.

"Western journalists often write that Marshal Yazov was the last USSR minister of defence. They allege that the latter firmly managed the four-million army, the largest group of troops in Europe, ocean fleet… They say Saposhnikov got a crumbling army. "Aren't you hurt with such estimates?" the correspondent asks Yevgeny Shaposhnikov.

"As is commonly known, truth is in the middle. By the time I was appointed the USSR minister of defence, the army had already been infected by devastating trends: the abolition of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, withdrawal of our troops from the countries of the Eastern Europe, the dubious use of troops in BAKU (highlighted by the author), Tbilisi, Vilnius with the higher political bodies of the country dissociating themselves from those actions, the useless introduction of army units in Moscow in August 1991, acquisition of sovereignty by the subjects of the USSR with demands of immediate consideration of the status of the Armed Forces deployed in their territories, attempts of infringement by individual deputies (including the military ones) on the undivided authority under the flag of democratization, the uncertainty of the further fate of the party and political bodies after the abolition of Clause 6 of the USSR Constitution. All this was going on in the conditions of the thesis of building "renewed democratic socialism with human face and Communist prospects" declared by the political leaders of the country.

This is what he says after ten years. But then, after the introduction of troops in Baku, when he became minister of defence of the crumbling USSR, he threatened Turkey with a nuclear bomb in case if it interfered in the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict, which was not its intention any way.

It was expected that after Air Marshal Y. Shaposhnikov became Commander-In-Chief of the CIS Allied Forces, some captatio benevolentiae would follow on the part of the new generalship of the army, since its guilt before Azerbaijan was so great! But what happened was quite the reverse; Shaposhnikov declared the southern direction, including Azerbaijan, as the primary threat for the CIS! When occasion offered, he depicted Azerbaijan as the enemy of Russia and threatened Baku insolently.

Always smiling not very sanely, the "patriot" Marshal Shaposhnikov (his disgusting smile used to disappear when he threatened Baku), did not conceal that he was ready, as soon as the order was given, to carry out any punishing actions against Baku again, and he did carry them out on his own initiative.

It was the Commander-In-Chief of the CIS Allied Forces Air Marshal Y. Shaposhnikov that gave the secret order to the 366th regiment to neutralize firing-points and defensive fortifications of the Azerbaijani, thereby paving the way to Khojaly for the Armenians. According to Financial Times, 22 May, 1992, in response to all military manoeuvres of Turkey, Commander-In-Chief of the CIS Allied Forces Air Marshal Y. Shaposhnikov said firmly that "the involvement of a third party in the conflict (Armenian-Azerbaijan one - Author) is fraught with the beginning of a third world war."

Duygu Bazoglu Sezer, one of the major Turkish foreign policy experts, Professor of international relations at Bilkent University in Ankara, writes in his article From Hostility to the Controlled Rivalry. Russian-Turkish Relations a Decade Later, 17 December, 2001, "Another structural complicating factor in the Russian-Turkish relations is the spreading and probably systematic instability in the neighbouring regions where both countries declare their important, in case of Russia vital, interests. There was at least one situation caused by the invasion of Armenian in Azerbaijan in April 1992 when they were on the brink of war. It was then that Russia resorted to an open nuclear threat to restrain Turkey, when Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, the commander of the CIS Armed Forces, warned of the danger of a "third world war" in case if Turkey interfered in the conflict to assist the Azerbaijan armed forces to repel the Armenian attack."

No one was surely going to get involved in that conflict directly and even in that case there would have been no third world war. It was just Marshal tried to toady before Gorbachev without a moment's hesitation and worked off the Armenian money he had been paid!

Many, though not yet all, facts of Y. Shaposhnikov's biography are gradually become clear and so is his position.

The ever-smiling minister Shaposhnikov was bought lock, stock and barrel and hooked by the Armenians. Literaturnaya Gazeta wrote on 13 May, 1992, "On 3 October, 1991 minister of defence Y. Shaposhnikov signed Order 171. Chief of Support Services of long-ranged aviation Lieutenant General G. Karakozov took up a new appointment, the head of Chief Trade Administration of the CIS Armed Forces (from the rear to the advanced position in theft! - Author)."

"The former head of Chief Trade Administration of Moscow garrison explained that on 2 December, 1991, at the verbal direction of comrade Karakozov G.A. he gave the purchasing order for imported furniture (Renaissance dining room suite, D-10 bedroom suite, Giaconda upholstered suite, 710 dining room suite, Philipp office suite, Mona Lisa upholstered suite) with total cost of about 200,000 rouble… he is aware that the above-mentioned furniture is purchased for comrade Shaposhnikov Y., which was confirmed in the course of the given checkup by comrade Karakozov as well." It is as clear as day that this is just the visible tip of the corruption iceberg!

Later, the mortal enemy of Baku turned out to be involved in theft in Aeroflot and to maintain close relationship with Armenian businessmen, as Russian newspapers wrote.

After the USSR collapse the baton of provocation against Baku was picked up by minister of defence of Russia P. Grachev, giving 1 billion worth armament to Armenia with Yeltsin's consent.

That is the continuity of the Soviet army!

At 11.00 p.m. on 27 April, 1920 parliament adopted the resolution on passing the power to the Azerbaijan Revolutionary Committee. At the same time a leaflet was spread in Baku.

"Attention! Attention! Attention! Moscow, to Lenin.

Provisional Military Revolutionary Committee of the Azerbaijan Soviet Independent Republic that came in power of the will of the revolutionary proletariat of Baku and working peasantry of Azerbaijan…

Having no opportunity of restraining the pressure of external and internal counterrevolutionary gangs by our own efforts, the Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan… requests immediate actual support by sending Red Army detachments."

This leaflet was spread on the night of 28 April, 1920 and the advanced units of the army had already reached Baku.

On 19 January the USSR Supreme Council adopted the disastrous resolution "On the declaration of state of emergency in Baku". The population was not notified of the planned use of troops and of the beginning of the regime in advance. State of emergency was put into operation almost immediately, at 12.00 a.m. on 20 January, 1990. At 7.27 p.m. on 19 January Azerbaijan television was already disabled. At 12.20 a.m. 9 citizens were killed by the military. The reservists and servicemen of Armenian nationality were particularly notable for their brutality. Only at 7.00 a.m. 20 January, after the barbaric intrusion into the city, killing all peaceful people that had come along, crushing transport vehicles, firing buildings, ambulances, the military authorities declared state of emergency on the radio. By the moment state of emergency was declared to the population 82 people had been killed and 20 fatally wounded (all deceased in hospitals) by the military.

The Soviet power in Azerbaijan began with lies and provocations and ended in the very same way!

Bodies of the civilians killed by Gorbachev's order in Baku were still warm when he said to foreign journalists instead of showing repentance, "Any attempts of establishing an Islamic state in Azerbaijan will be opposed with force. We will act with responsibility but resolutely."

One way or another, he will lie all the years following the January events. Now he said that the introduction of troops had been an act of opposition to the attempts of stablishing an Islamic state in Azerbaijan, then he said that he had brought troops in Baku to protect the Armenians, and then he will say that he had been restoring Soviet power in Azerbaijan and saving… Vezirov from gibbet. In his last interview to Radio Liberty more than 10 years later he suddenly said that he had brought troops in Baku on the insistence of… Primakov who had been there at that time.

Twelve years later, Gorbachev recalls the January tragedy, "Well, things like this happen to everyone and perhaps everyone can get into such situations," he says to Azerbaijan film makers calmly, almost philosophically. "We phone to Baku, they report that the situation is under control. But the situation is such that some emergency measures should be taken. I send Primakov Yevgeny and Ghirenko Andrey there. Primakov says, "Mikhail Sergeyevich, we must take urgent measures." I send for the minister of internal affairs Bakatin. I say, "We must contact minister of defence, make suggestions." He answers, "We cannot act just on the word, give us Presidential Resolution. Right. Well, we kind of had a talk. I say, "Let's adopt the Resolution then." Resolution was adopted, right there, officially. I made a speech before I made my mind about it. Well, it was all consciously. The Azerbaijani cursed me. So, you know, it is like that, once you pledge, don't hedge. And it is always a tragedy, especially for contrite people."

After shedding blood like water in Baku, Gorbachev speaks about "pledges" and "hedges" instead of saying words of repentance. This leopard marked by the devil, will never change his spots.

The former head of the Azerbaijan SSR KGB Vaghif Huseynov, now a citizen of Russia, says something like that. "Corpses were still lying in the streets of Baku," says V. Huseynov with some strange sarcasm more then ten years after the events he took an active part in, "when bosses of the democratic opposition began overwriting history. "The intrusion of the vast contingent of units of the Soviet Army and internal troops into Baku was accompanied by particular brutality and unprecedented atrocities. As a result of the massacre of civilians and unlawful introduction of troops, 131 civilians were killed, 744 wounded, 841 illegally arrested… Servicemen ruined and burned 200 houses and flats," the official Azerbaijan version of the tragedy has been saying for years. Not a single word about pogroms and other "inconvenient" details of those events." Well, it is the then head of the Azerbaijan KGB V. Huseynov who has to speak publicly "about pogroms and other "inconvenient" details of those events" and reveal them. As a authorized representative of the Centre, he knows much about secret special operations carried out in Baku in those days.

There are many questions to ask V. Huseynov about the events of 20 January, 1990 in Baku.

According to the former head of the Azerbaijan KGB, General I. Huseynov, and Colonel I. Makhmudov, it was in V. Huseynov's presence that important documents concerning the events of 20 January, 1990 in Baku were destroyed.

of the Azerbaijan Republic
21 December, 1991
To the Chairman of the Investigating
Commission of the Azerbaijan
Republic Supreme Council

Comrade Abasov M.T.

We refer to Your inquire: in the period of the events of January 1990 the actions in the line of the former KGB were guided by deputy head of the former KGB of the USSR Comrades Bobkov F.D., Pirozhkov V.P., Agayev G.Y.

These actions involved a large group of the USSR KGB agents sent on the mission to the Committee of the republic.

There are no materials available in the archive of Ministry of National Security concerning the actions carried out by the USSR KGB in the period of the January events of 1990.

Major General I. Huseynov

During the period from 1 January, 1990 ciphered telegrams "On the situation in the republic" were sent from the State Security Committee of the Azerbaijan SSR to the KGB of the USSR. At the direction of the former chairman of the Azerbaijan KGB Comrade Huseynov V.A. all these ciphered telegrams were destroyed as confirmed by Act 524, 17 February, 1990.

Head of the 8th department of the MNS
of the Azerbaijan Republic
Colinel I. Makhmudov

As we know, "manuscripts don't burn". Most important documents do not burn completely either. There is always something left somewhere somehow; what remains always gives a chance to get to the truth. Such documents often rise from their ashes like Phoenix! Gorbachev used to say many times that the documents concerning the pact concluded by Ribbentrop and Molotov had disappeared; however, when they were really necessary, especially for the Baltic countries, the documents were immediately found, though not all, and the remaining doubts concerning the nature of that pact were dispersed. At present, the positions of the politicians who are guilty of Baku events are quite strong in Moscow; so they "cannot" those important documents there. The author is convinced that the time will come when those people are relegated to oblivion, which is soon, and most of these document will see the light. The most striking example is the tragic execution of 22,000 Polish officers in Katyn. A. Yakovlev recalls that he had asked Gorbachev to find those documents dozens times and received the invariable answer, "How can I find them for you?" though he had known perfectly well that those documents were kept in the General Department, in a top secret folder. Later A. Yakovlev will wonder, "Why was he lying to me?" It was Lebedeva who chanced to come upon the tracks of those documents. They were found in… the convoy troops of NKVD.

Here is a small but very informative reference, an echo of the January events. The record of "Region" Joint-stock Company and "Sistema" joint-stock financial Corporation, Sergey Gorshkov, says, "The foundation of "Region" research centre was in many ways a blind imitation of the similar structure in "Most" group and a tribute to fashion (how can there be "grey eminence" and election staff without a research centre?) Vaghif Huseynov was probably recommended to the post of the head of this centre by Gusinsky on the tip of F. Bobkov. We can speak with a certain confidence about close relations between Huseynov and Bobkov that transformed into some kind of dependence of the former from the latter in the period of the introduction of troops in Baku (Bobkov went to Huseynov then). Just like in "Most", THE BACKBONE IS COMPOSED OF SECRET SERVICE OFFICERS (highlighted by the author)."

Gleb Pavlovsky writes in his article Gefter and Old Things, "The analysis of Perestroika requires that we recall its nasty details (much pettier in their meanness than Baku crushed by Gorbachev with the authority of Sakharov and us all)." Pavlovsky is probably right. But for the sake of justice, we should first analyse thoroughly Gorbachev's more important mean acts to which Gleb Pavlovsky fairly relates the tragedy of the Azerbaijan people, 20 January, 1990, and then pass to smaller ones. But that would require a scientific research institute!

In a number of his interviews Gorbachev hints unambiguously that the primary person responsible for the January events in Baku was Primakov. But it is a lie; such large-scale operation could be planned and realized only by the first person of the state, while the rest, including Primakov, were performers. The point is not that. Gorbachev cannot forgive his ex-friend and political comrade-in-arms for the latter's giving him away carefully to Yeltsin and succeeding in many things.

Then Primakov gave away Luzhkov to Yeltsn, and finally all of them to Putin, which ensured him a high post in the government, and immediately began spinning intrigues against Prime Minister Kasyanov. We can see that he left Gorbachev far behind in the art of mischief-making, which is a deadly blow for the latter who got used to betray and re-betray himself!

Besides, it is quite possible that Primakov obscurely divided the means received in his time from the Gulf countries before the war, and Gorbachev still had open questions.

On 13 October, 1837, in the course of Russian-Iranian war of 1826-1828, the Russian troops under the command of the governor of the Caucasus Ivan Fedorovich Paskevich took Erivan (the present-day Yerevan) by assault. According to historians, there were no victims among the civilian population. The title of Count of Erivan was granted to Paskevich to commemorate the victory.

On 20 January, 1990, the Soviet troops sent by Gorbachev under Yazov's command took the peaceful city of Baku, killing and wounding several hundreds of civilians, for which the Azerbaijan people granted Gorbachev the "title" Bloody Gorbachev.

Certain Western circles wanted to improve Gorbachev's image by awarding him Nobel Prize but they were discomforted with the mass murder of civilians in the USSR, which could not but shock them. After having been awarded Nobel Prize in Peace, Gorbachev sent his representative, as had been agreed, to receive it, and the chairman of Nobel Prize Committee declared publicly that Gorbachev was awarded the prize "for the foreign and not home policy". That was probably was of the most disgraceful procedure in the history of Nobel Prize Committee after awarding Hitler Nobel Prize in 1938. Awarding Hitler and Gorbachev Nobel Prize is indelible disgrace in the history of Nobel Prize Committee and two of many mysterious events in the history of the mankind.

It is pertinent to note that the KGB was also trying to improve its image in every possible way those years. In 1990, after the bloody events in Baku, even Miss KGB was elected, a beautiful Lieutenant girl.

Azerbaijan will never be able and should not forgive or justify 20 January, 1990. Never. Those who were in power then are responsible for it. "I think," M.S. Gorbachev said, "that we can never and should not forgive or justify what happened in 1937-38. Those who were in power then are responsible for it." These words might just as well be related to the events in Baku and to M.S. Gorbachev himself first of all.

Having done much work on collection of materials concerning the crimes of the Soviet troops in Baku, the commission failed to get the results of its work both to the Soviet and international community. One had the impression that the heads of the commission were playing some political games far from the point of the matter.

The famous composer Arif Melikov also did great work collecting facts of the January events and releasing innocent people who had more or less taken part in them from prison. He gives a precise estimate of the work of the commission.

"The Investigating Commission of the Azerbaijan Republic Supreme Council is a special issue. In three years, it did not publish a single serious document. The issue of its establishment was discussed in Moscow by the deputy corps of Azerbaijan. They were arguing for a long time what kind of commission should be established to analyse the causes of the invasion, the form of its realization, all consequences promptly. Had the commission brought the entire truth to the international community, its resolution could have become the indictment against all who had authorized and performed that barbaric action.

I demanded that the commission should consist not only of deputies and other representatives of Azerbaijan but also deputies of the USSR Supreme Council, other republics, that independent lawyers from the Soviet Union and foreign countries should be involved in its work and that it should be established under the aegis of the USSR Supreme Council. Many of our deputies agreed with me in the lobby and private conversations but when the leaders of the republic opposed my demand no one supported me.

Executing the guidelines of the Centre, the leaders of the republic restricted the scale of this commission to the republic and the deputies from Azerbaijan that had agreed with these conclusions found or invented excuses, saying that "we are the most interested people and do not need any outside help."

We would not like to comment upon the activities of the heads of that commission. It is the prerogative of history!

In full accordance with the well-known saying, "Mistrust first impulses; they are nearly always good", some time after the intrusion of the Soviet troops in Baku, some politicians and journalists considerably moderated their attitude to those responsible for the tragedy in Baku.

It was with a sore heart that we read in foreign press that certain political circles had invited Gorbachev to Turkey where he had been received by high-ranking statesmen.

And finally, having killed hundreds of people in Baku, Tbilisi, Vilnius, in flash points, Gorbachev took loving care of his own safety and health.

V.I. Boldin recalls General Secretary's concern about his health.

"Once in winter of 1983 he suddenly said, perplexing me, "You know, I'm going to die soon…"

Mikhail Sergeyevich was staring somewhere into vacancy consumed with his sad musings.

"Why such mysticism? Or have doctors frightened you?"

"My father died at this age, I have the same symptoms."

I knew well that he was not ill at all then, still quite strong, as for blood pressure, atherosclerosis and other cardiovascular diseases, these are troubles of virtually everyone, especially those who like to sit in the chair and make a good meal. He was very suspicious about his health. When he was young he received treatment in Zheleznovodsk and always made doctors find things he had not. He had keen appetite and if he abstained from something, it was rather due to overeating, necessity to control weight. About two times a week he used to have fasting days. Special sour cream curds were cooked for him and he had to hold out for a day." It is really a mystery of the twentieth century how such a hypochondriac and faint-hearted man who could not control either his wife or daughter, or granddaughter, or his inner circle, managed to rise to the height of power in the USSR!

The famous and undoubtedly talented lawyer Henry Reznik writes concerning the intention of Baku to institute criminal proceedings against Gorbachev for the events of 20 January, 1990, "Interpol will tell them to get lost! There is such a notion as period of limitation. They accuse Gorbachev of abusing his authority, don't they? But, I beg your pardon, thirteen years have passed since 1990, while the period of limitation is ten years!"

After such words the image of Reznik as a courageous fighter for justice faded somehow. The Jew caught and hung Eichman for monstrous crimes against the Jewish people even after 30 years. And they continue to search for surviving Nazi criminals responsible for the genocide of the Jewish people all over the world! They are right, since there is no period of limitation for such crimes!

Another statement concerning Gorbachev's crime is more encouraging. The head of international law department at MGIMO Yuri Kolosov said in his interview, "The situation is like that of Pinochet or Zavgayev. Gorbachev is virtually a citizen of a different state for Azerbaijan. Clearly, he will not come running to surrender to the Azerbaijani authorities. To try Gorbachev, Baku should reasonably make a request to Moscow to extradite the suspect. However, there are no appropriate bilateral agreements on extradition between Russia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan is not a member of European Convention on Extradition that Russia joined. So Azerbaijan (with indeed powerful evidence of Gorbachev's guilt) can only declare him wanted through Interpol. And then, if Mikhail Sergeyevich goes somewhere outside Russia, Interpol might catch him…" Well, if it must be Interpol, let it be Interpol. It might as well be through sexual minority league! If only Gorbachev appeared before the court in Baku!

Gorbachev's granddaughter was marrying. The wedding party was organized by "Patel et Chabot". Roasted hazel-grouses, elk lips, red and black caviar were served to the guests, and the highlight of the gastronomic performance was a triple deck wedding cake a meter and half of height. The newly married couple will spend their honey moon in Italy. None of the invited honoured guest appeared, since Gorbachev is long used "archive" material; only sometimes Putin uses his relations with foreign political figures established owing to the betrayal of the USSR interests.

But those young people that had been killed by Gorbachev's order are lying in the Alley of SHEKHIDS and many of them, unlike Gorbachev's granddaughter, had no time to know what love, wedding, family mean.